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The Farmer and the Tax Man: 
The Scope of the Tax Forgiveness Provision 
in Chapter 12 Bankruptcy 
Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012) 
DAVID A. MARTIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jason and Jodi LeGassick were a young couple in their early thirties 
who lived with their five children on land that had been in their family for 
generations.1  Since they were teenagers, the LeGassicks made their living 
together by dairy farming.2  Despite their innovation and experience, the farm 
became unprofitable.3  Debts accumulated, banks threatened foreclosure, and 
the couple filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 12.4  After filing, the couple 
proposed the sale of their land to facilitate payment of their debts.5  The sale 
produced approximately $81,000 in tax obligations.6  By contrast, the cou-
ple’s income totaled $107,000 annually.7  The LeGassicks filed their plan 
with the court, but because of the burdensome tax obligations, the court re-
fused to confirm their reorganization plan and dismissed the couple from 
Chapter 12 proceedings.8  As a result, the couple lost their land, their home, 
and the only livelihood they had ever known. 
  
 * B.S., Boise State University 2009; J.D., University of Missouri School of 
Law 2012.  A great thanks to Professor Cecil, who introduced me to the wonders of 
bankruptcy and tax law, for her valuable assistance not only with this Comment, but 
also throughout my time in law school and the beginning of my legal career.  A spe-
cial thanks to my case note editors, Kyle Gottuso and Joe Blumberg, who also made 
this Comment possible.  
 1. Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Neil E. Hart et al. in Support of Petitioners 
at 9, Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012) (No. 10-875), 2011 WL 3821043, 
at * 9 [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Neil E. Hart et al.]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at *10. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Although these statements do not reflect what happened to the LeGassicks, 
as stated supra, many other debtors have suffered a similar fate.  See 145 CONG. REC. 
S764 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1999-01-20/pdf/CREC-1999-01-20.pdf. 
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Without the benefit of tax forgiveness afforded by Bankruptcy Code 
(Code) section 1222(a)(2)(A), this unfortunate tale would have been the fate 
of the LeGassicks.9  Section 1222(a)(2)(A) allows a debtor to discharge cer-
tain tax obligations in Chapter 12 bankruptcies upon the completion of his 
reorganization plan.10  In reality, section 1222(a)(2)(A) allowed the bank-
ruptcy court to confirm the LeGassicks’ payment plan and the couple did not 
lose their farm.11  If the LeGassicks complete their plan, the tax obligations 
from the sale of their farm will be discharged in full.12  
Unfortunately, the benefits of section 1222(a)(2)(A) enjoyed by the Le-
Gassicks are not available to all farmers.  While the LeGassicks enjoyed the 
Eighth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the provision, the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits severely restrict the reach of section 1222(a)(2)(A) and thereby allow 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a veto over the bankruptcies of farmers 
hoping to sell assets to preserve their livelihood.13  The IRS, a primary pro-
ponent and beneficiary of this line of decisions, convinced federal circuit 
courts to adopt a restrictive interpretation of section 1222(a)(2)(A) in spite of 
convincing legislative intent to the contrary.14  Much of the IRS’s success is 
attributable to the noticeable lack of statutory clarity, combined with the 
complexity of the Code.15 
In Hall v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari upon the petition of debtors from the Ninth Circuit and resolved the 
circuit split in favor of the IRS.16  Faced with the familiar task of statutory 
interpretation, the opinion of the Supreme Court will inevitably affect eco-
nomically distressed farmers nationwide.  A primary concern of the Court 
was that an incorrect statutory interpretation would leave the Code in sham-
bles because of the interdependency of its provisions.17  
Because Hall primarily addresses issues of statutory interpretation, Part 
II of this Comment will outline the statutory background of the two statutes 
primarily at issue in the circuit split.18  Next, Part III of this Comment will 
survey the diverging circuit decisions concerning the interpretation and scope 
  
 9. See Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Neil E. Hart et al., supra note 1, at 
*11-12.  
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 11. See Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Neil E. Hart et al., supra note 1, at 
*10. 
 12. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A). 
 13. See Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012); United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012). 
 14. Hall, 617 F.3d at 1167. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1883 (2012). 
 17. See id. at 1187. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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of section 1222(a)(2)(A).19  Then, Part IV will examine and, to the extent 
possible, resolve the arguments of the parties.20  Part V will outline the Su-
preme Court decision.21  Finally, Part VI will consider proposed amendments 
to increase clarity and prevent future statutory interpretation disputes.22 
II.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The laws of bankruptcy and taxation are primarily statutory.  A principal 
canon of statutory construction requires courts to attempt to discern the legis-
lature’s intent when enacting the statute.23  To accomplish this task, courts 
first look to the plain meaning of existing statutory text, but unfortunately, 
ambiguity is inherent in the English language, and commonly, one can find 
multiple “plain meanings.”24  If the plain meaning rule does not resolve the 
issue of legislative intent, it may be resolved by canons of interpretation25 or 
contextual logic.26  In addition, courts often examine the particular circum-
stances surrounding the inception of a statute, including prior law and legisla-
tive history.27  
The focus of this Comment involves the statutory interplay between 
bankruptcy and tax law.  Accordingly, it is helpful to consider the background 
of the statutes most directly at issue.  First, this Part will discuss the consid-
erations historically and currently afforded to farmers under bankruptcy law.  
The discussion will begin with the treatment of farmers in early American 
bankruptcy and continue until the implementation of today’s Chapter 12.  
This Part will then provide the background and analysis of section 
1222(a)(2)(A).  Second, because the statutes are central to the IRS’s argu-
ments concerning section 1222(a)(2)(A), this Part will discuss the statutory 
background of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) sections 1398 and 1399. 
  
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See infra Part VI. 
 23. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The starting point in dis-
cerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text”). 
 24. Id.; see, e.g., id. at 536. 
 25. In re Smale, 390 B.R. 111, 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (“If the statute is am-
biguous, the Court must use other canons of statutory construction, including legisla-
tive history where available, to determine the purpose of the statute.”). 
 26. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997) (“The plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute 
as a whole.”). 
 27. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 539. 
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A.  Bankruptcy 
As with many other aspects of American law, the beginnings of Ameri-
can bankruptcy can be traced to early English law.28  When the English Par-
liament passed the first bankruptcy act in 1542, consumer credit and debt 
were considered immoral.29  The legislative act was “quasi-criminal in na-
ture” and labeled debtors as “offenders.”30  In stark contrast to the current 
bankruptcy system, only creditors could invoke the act and no provisions 
provided debtors with the financial relief of discharge.31  However, the Eng-
lish eventually changed their outlook on the morality of bankruptcy and 
passed a new act in 1705, which removed the criminal characterization of 
debtors and provided for discharge of debtor obligations under limited cir-
cumstances.32  The legal commentator William Blackstone observed the 
evolving trend when he stated that “the laws of bankruptcy are considered as 
laws calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of hu-
manity as well as justice: and to that end they confer some privileges, not 
only on the creditors, but also on the debtor or bankrupt himself.”33 
Under this more forgiving legal atmosphere, the United States emerged 
as a sovereign nation.34  During the nineteenth century, in response to various 
national economic concerns, Congress enacted three controversial bankruptcy 
acts that focused on providing liquidation for the benefit of creditors with 
little attention to the needs of debtors.35  Though short-lived, these acts made 
notable contributions to the field, including voluntary bankruptcy proceedings 
and the introduction of reorganization proceedings.36  
  
 28. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) (“We take our bankruptcy sys-
tem from England, and we naturally assume that the fundamental principles upon 
which it was administered were adopted by us when we copied the system, somewhat 
as the established construction of a law goes with the words where they are copied by 
another state.”). 
 29. David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of Insol-
vency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today’s United 
States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 169 
(2000). 
 30. Id. at 168-69. 
 31. Id. at 169. 
 32. Id. at 169-70. 
 33. Id. at 170 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 472 (1765)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. John C. Anderson & Rex D. Rainach, Farmer Reorganizations Under the 
New Bankruptcy Code, 28 LOY. L. REV. 439, 444 (1982). 
 36. Kennedy & Clift, supra note 29, at 171-73. 
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1.  Bankruptcy and Farmers 
Near the turn of the twentieth century, the United States passed its first 
permanent bankruptcy act against the backdrop of the rising tide of commer-
cial interest in the American economy and politics.37  The Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 is considered by many to be the foundation of modern bankruptcy law.38  
It established many elements that remain essential to the current bankruptcy 
system, including the fresh start principle, inclusion of both involuntary and 
voluntary proceedings, the allowance of exemptions, and the ability to re-
cover fraudulently transferred assets.39  The act was also the first to provide 
different and more lenient rules for farmers by exempting them from involun-
tary proceedings.40  The rationale for specialized consideration of farmers 
was to prevent creditors from forcing farming operations into liquidation after 
and to protect farmers from unpredictable fluctuations of commodity prices.41  
The necessity of specialized treatment for farmers again became appar-
ent during the Great Depression.  In 1933, Congress added section 75, enti-
tled “Relief for Farmers,”42 which enabled bankruptcy courts to confirm 
composition or extension agreements for farmers’ debts.43 Section 75 was 
rendered largely ineffective, however, because creditors were permitted to 
veto debtor plans.44  The Frazier-Lemke Act of 193445 revitalized section 75 
  
 37. Id. at 175. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Mike Lowry, Note, A New Paint Job on an ‘85 Yugo: BAPCPA Improves 
Chapter 12 but Will It Really Make a Difference?, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 231, 237 
(2007). 
 41. Jerome M. Stam & Bruce L. Dixon, Farmer Bankruptcies and Farm Exits in 
the United States, 1899-2002, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 788 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.), 
Mar. 2004, at 2-3, http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib788/aib788.pdf. 
 42. Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289. (1934). 
 43. Steven Shapiro, Note, An Analysis of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 
1986, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 353, 354 (1987); see also David P. Bart & Scott Peltz, 
Rethinking the Concept of “Success” in Bankruptcy and Corporate Recovery, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 1998, at 33, 36 (“A composition agreement is a contractual 
agreement between the debtor and its creditors whereby the creditors discharge a 
portion or all of their claims against the debtor in exchange for payment of a lesser 
amount than what is actually owed.  In contrast, under an extension agreement, only 
the payment terms are revised, thereby permitting the debtor to repay its obligations 
for a negotiated period of time.”).   
 44. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 353-54. 
 45. Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289, invalidated 
by Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).  The Supreme 
Court invalidated the act as an unconstitutional taking.  Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank, 295 U.S. at 601-02 (“[W]e must hold [the 1934 Act] void; for the Fifth 
Amendment commands that, however great the nation’s need, private property shall 
not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation.”).  How-
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by installing mechanisms to impede the right of secured creditors to foreclose 
on farmland.46  The 1934 amendment allowed debtors to retain possession of 
real property in bankruptcy and gave debtors the option to subsequently re-
purchase farmland at appraised values.47  By 1950, the troubling economic 
times of the Great Depression had faded and section 75 expired on its own 
terms.48 
Following the expiration of section 75, Chapter 12 became the most ap-
propriate vehicle for farmers seeking financial relief.49  While seldom used 
due to the thriving economy of the mid-twentieth century, Chapter 12 af-
forded debtors the opportunity to restructure debt secured by real estate in 
lieu of forfeiting the property.50  In effect, the chapter allowed debtors “to 
shift the risk of deflated land values to . . . creditors” and to retain land neces-
sary for their livelihood, a concept continued in subsequent legislation.51 
While the Act of 1898 and future amendments were implemented with 
the best of intentions, the application of the special provisions for farmers 
presented some difficulties, particularly with the threshold definition of what 
constituted a “farmer.”52  Prior to 1978, a farmer was defined as:  
[A]n individual personally engaged in farming or tillage of the soil, 
and shall include an individual personally engaged in dairy farming 
or in the production of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock 
  
ever, Congress subsequently enacted a version of the Frazier-Lemke Act that was 
more favorable to creditors in 1935.  Frazier-Lemke Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 
49 Stat. 942 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 203 (1940)); see also Anna Gelpern 
& Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Resi-
dential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1144-46 (2009) 
(“Compared with the original 1934 Frazier-Lemke Act, the 1935 version gave the 
debtor less time to buy back the farm for more money.”). 
 46. Anderson & Rainach, supra note 35, at 448. 
 47. Id. at 449; Shapiro, supra note 43, at 354 (“Under the [1934 amendment], if 
the creditor and farmer could not agree on a redemption plan, ‘the farmer was ad-
judged a bankrupt, but was given a moratorium of five to six years within which to 
buy back his property from the court and his creditors[.]’  During this moratorium, the 
farmer was allowed to keep his property in return for a ‘reasonable rental,’ and the 
farmer retained the exclusive right to redeem his property at its appraised value.  
What this meant was that the farmer could scale down his indebtedness, regardless of 
the encumbrances on it, to its depression-appraised value and redeem his property at 
that value, thereby forcing the creditor to assume the full brunt of the deflation in 
farm land values.”). 
 48. Anderson & Rainach, supra note 35, at 461. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 461-62, 464. 
 51. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 357. 
 52. See id. 
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products in their unmanufactured state, if the principal part of his 
income is derived from any one or more of such operations.53   
Cases illustrate the functional vagueness of the various threshold provisions, 
and attempts at application often led to costly litigation.54  
Despite the relatively progressive nature of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
after nearly eighty years it became clear that the act suffered from procedural 
deficiencies concerning the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and the 
role of bankruptcy judges as administrators.55 President Jimmy Carter signed 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as an attempt to rectify deficiencies of 
the previous act by expanding jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, which al-
lowed original jurisdiction over civil proceedings arising within bankruptcy 
cases and relieved bankruptcy judges from several administrative duties.56  
The 1978 act also afforded specialized protections for farmers; involuntary 
petitions could not be filed against farmers, nor could farmers be forced to 
convert to Chapter 7, which provides solely for liquidation, if the farmers 
filed voluntarily and sought reorganization under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.57  
Further, states could opt out of federal exemptions.58  Because the federal 
exemptions included caps, the new feature benefitted farmers in states that 
had no dollar caps on farming equipment exemptions.59   
The 1978 act redefined “farmer” as a “person that received more than 
[eighty] percent of such person's gross income during the taxable year of such 
person immediately preceding the taxable year of such person during which 
the case under this title concerning such person was commenced from a farm-
ing operation owned or operated by such person.”60  For the first time, the 
scope of “farmer” was broadened to include partnerships and corporations.61  
On the other hand, the threshold definition of “farmer,” though significantly 
  
 53. Id. at 357 n.29 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1(17) (1976)). 
 54. Id. at 357; see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Bridgeport, Conn. v. 
Beach, 301 U.S. 435 (1937) (holding that an individual who rented three-fourths of 
his farm to others for cultivation qualified as a farmer under section 75 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act); Jenkins v. Petitioning Creditor-Ray E. Friedman & Co., 664 F.2d 184 
(8th Cir. 1981) (finding that borrowed funds do not count towards an individual’s 
income in determining his status as a farmer); Shyvers v. Sec.-First Nat’l Bank of 
L.A., 108 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding that an individual who leases farmland to 
others for operation is not “personally engaged” in the farming and thus does not 
qualify as a farmer within the meaning of section 75).  
 55. Kennedy & Clift, supra note 29, at 177. 
 56. Id. at 178-79. 
 57. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 358-59. 
 58. Id. at 359. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 357-58 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1(17) (1982)). 
 61. Id. at 358. 
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altered, severely curtailed the applicability of the provisions.62  This amend-
ment provided a formulaic definition to resolve the uncertainty surrounding 
previous definitions, but also rendered many intended beneficiaries ineligible 
for protections against involuntary proceedings and liquidation.63  
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (BAPCPA) is Congress’ most recent attempt at wholesale bankruptcy 
reform64 and is currently in effect.  The act primarily responded to the conten-
tion that consumers were abusing the bankruptcy system by a perceived “lack 
of personal financial accountability, the proliferation of serial filings, and the 
absence of effective oversight to eliminate abuse in the system.”65  However, 
BAPCPA also made significant changes to chapters largely inapplicable to 
consumers, including chapters providing bankruptcy relief to family farmers 
and fishermen (Chapter 12), as well as corporations (Chapter 11), municipali-
ties (Chapter 9), and cross-border insolvencies (Chapter 15).66  Chapter 12 is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
2.  Chapter 12 
a.  Prelude 
While the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 permitted some preferential treat-
ment with respect to farmers, its drafters failed to anticipate the economic 
circumstances of the 1980s.  In the early 1980s, the world faced a severe re-
cession, and the American agricultural industry, affected heavily by embar-
gos, inflation, increased supply and decreased demand, and massive amounts 
of secured debt incurred by farmers during the preceding decade, was no ex-
ception.67  
During this period, financially distressed farmers seeking to avoid liqui-
dation were forced to choose between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceedings, only to discover that neither chapter was well suited for their 
specialized needs.  Debtors seeking relief under Chapter 13 quickly realized 
that the drafters designed the chapter for consumers, not farmers.68  Low debt 
ceilings – capped at $100,000 for unsecured debt and $350,000 for secured 
debt – prevented many farmers from meeting threshold requirements for 
Chapter 13 eligibility.69  Additionally, because Chapter 13 provided relief 
  
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
 66. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 §§ 
401-11, 501-02, 801-02, 1501, 119 Stat. 23. 
 67. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 360-61. 
 68. Id. at 362. 
 69. Id. 
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only for individuals, farms operating under a partnership agreement or a cor-
porate charter were also ineligible.70  Beyond the screening effect of the 
threshold requirements, the provisions of Chapter 13 proved to be irreconcil-
able with the financial situation of most farmers.  For instance, Chapter 13’s 
requirement that debtors have a regular stream of income is incompatible 
with the “seasonal nature of farming.”71  Providing yet another obstacle, 
Chapter 13 required repayment plans to be filed within fifteen days of a peti-
tion’s filing date , which was unreasonable given farmers’ lack of regular 
income.72  Finally, Chapter 13 failed to provide relief for debt secured by a 
debtor’s principal residence, which farm lenders often demanded as collat-
eral.73 
In the absence of Chapter 12, most farmer bankruptcies took place under 
Chapter 11.74 Though generally more amenable to farmers than Chapter 13 
due to its lack of stringent threshold requirements and longer plan filing peri-
ods, Chapter 11 was rendered largely ineffective by the economic crisis in the 
1980s.75  During the crisis, many farmers’ assets were over-encumbered by 
liens and security interests, leaving farmers with very few assets to use to 
secure financing for necessary operating expenses.76  Adequate protection for 
retained collateral in particular provided a formidable obstacle to farmers 
seeking relief under Chapter 11, because the requirement was interpreted to 
extend to lost opportunity costs, which required farmers to make interest 
payments on the market value of collateral.77  As a secondary barrier, creditor 
claims concerning lack of adequate protection often pervaded Chapter 11 
proceedings and exhausted the farmers’ resources.78  Further, debtors lost 
opportunities to remove parties in interest and to liquidate unnecessary assets, 
because the bankruptcy code failed to allow trustees to sell unessential but 
encumbered farming assets.79  Finally, while Chapter 11’s filing period for 
repayment plans greatly exceeded Chapter 13’s period of fifteen days, the 
time constraint remained a practical impediment to relief for farmers under 
Chapter 11.80  Assuming a debtor could form a plan during the filing period, 
Chapter 11 permitted each class of creditors to veto debtors’ proposed 
plans.81  Compounding the farmers’ difficulties, when the filing period 
  
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 363. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 364. 
 75. Id. at 363-65.  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (Supp. II 1978), with 11 U.S.C. § 
109(e) (Supp. II 1978). 
 76. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 364. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 366. 
 80. Id. at 363, 365. 
 81. Id. at 365 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1982)). 
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elapsed, courts could confirm creditor plans unfavorable to a debtor, thereby 
thwarting the reorganization efforts of many farmers.82 
b.  Temporary Chapter 12 
In response to the growing recognition of bankruptcy issues unique to 
farmers,83 the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 passed as an amend-
ment to the 1978 act.84 The Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act created Chapter 
12, which was designed to give bankrupt family farmers a greater opportunity 
to reorganize and retain ownership of farmland.85   It “offer[ed] family farm-
ers the important protection from creditors that bankruptcy provides while, at 
the same time, preventing abuse of the system and ensuring that farm lenders 
receive a fair repayment.”86  Closely modeled after Chapter 13, the new chap-
ter removed several provisions considered inappropriate for family farmers.87 
The new legislation provided for bankruptcy provisions applicable only 
to family farmers, but unlike Chapter 13, Chapter 12 also allowed partner-
ships or corporations to qualify under its provisions.88  The Chapter 12 re-
quirements for eligibility as an individual included a percentage test, similar 
to the definition of “farmer” provided in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.89 How-
ever, the new requirements put a greater emphasis on percentage of debt, 
rather than percentage of income, and provided that as of the date of filing, 
individuals must have at least eighty percent of their debts arising out of a 
farming operation.90  Income remained a factor for eligibility, but the thresh-
old percentage fell from eighty percent to fifty percent.91  Corporations and 
partnerships qualified if family held more than fifty percent of outstanding 
stock or equity in the entity and no stock of the entity was publicly traded.92  
Chapter 12 eligibility further required that “eighty percent of an entity’s as-
sets . . . be related to debtor farming operation[s,]” and required that eighty 
  
 82. Id. (citing Jasik v. Conrad (In re Jasik), 727 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 99-958, at 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 
5249. 
 84. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). 
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 99-958, at 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 
5249. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 369-70 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) (Supp. 
1987)). 
 89. Id. at 369 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (Supp. 1987)). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 357-58, 369. 
 92. Id. at 370 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) (Supp. 1987)). 
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percent of an entity’s debts “arise from debtor farming operations.”93  The 
debt limit for both individuals and entities was capped at $1,500,000.94 
The new chapter also remedied several other recurring issues plaguing 
farmers attempting to file under Chapter 13.  For instance, the new chapter 
added a separate provision for adequate protection to remove the requirement 
of lost opportunity cost payments to secured creditors.95  Addressing yet an-
other concern, the chapter provided bankruptcy trustees with power to sell 
encumbered farm assets without permission of lien holders, which allowed 
farmers to liquidate their equity in unnecessary assets.96  Additionally, ad-
justments to the filing provisions increased the palatability of bankruptcy for 
farmers.97  The statute increased the filing period for plans to ninety days, but 
also granted power to courts to extend the filing period if “substantially justi-
fied.”98  Finally, decreasing creditor control over the bankruptcy process, 
Chapter 12 differed from other chapters by allowing only voluntary filings by 
debtors and permitted courts to confirm reorganization plans submitted by 
debtors over creditors’ objections.99 
c.  Permanent Implementation 
Unlike the current version of Chapter 12, the Family Farmer Bankruptcy 
Act was an experimental mechanism to combat the plight of farmers during 
the contemporaneous economic crisis and was drafted with a seven-year sun-
set provision.100  Originally set to expire in 1993, Chapter 12 was extended 
eleven times with minimal changes prior to its permanent implementation.101  
While the extensions were intended to benefit farmers, the piecemeal nature 
of the legislation subjected the industry to occasional gaps between the effec-
tive dates of extensions and caused sporadic availability and uncertainty.102  
Although a Congressional consensus had been reached several years prior to 
enactment of the permanent chapter, legislators seeking general bankruptcy 
reform sought to use the implementation of a permanent Chapter 12 as lever-
  
 93. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) (Supp. 1987)).   
 94. Id. at 369-70. 
 95. Id. at 370 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1205 (Supp. 1987)). 
 96. Id. at 371 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1206 (Supp. 1987)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 99. Id. at 371-72 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1225(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1987)). 
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 99-958, at 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 
5249. 
 101. See Stam & Dixon, supra note 41, at iii; Family Farmer Bankruptcy Relief 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-369, §§ 1-2, 118 Stat. 1749 (2004). 
 102. Lowry, supra note 40, at 243; see also Susan Schneider, Bankruptcy Reform: 
Changes to Chapter 12 – Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer, 2005 ARK. L. 
NOTES 113, 113 (2005). 
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age to gather votes of representatives of farming districts.103  After some po-
litical maneuvering, Congress enacted the permanent implementation of 
Chapter 12 as a component of BAPCPA, effective July 1, 2005.104 
While the previous extensions changed little from the original Chapter 
12, the BAPCPA amendments made several significant changes, including 
expansion of eligibility, modification of tax priorities, prohibition of retroac-
tive assessment of disposable income, extension of protections afforded to 
domestic obligations, as well as a myriad of other alterations and additions 
affecting all chapters.105  The current version of Chapter 12 affords debtors 
greater accessibility by increasing the maximum debt limit from $1,500,000 
to $3,237,000.106  Unlike previous versions of Chapter 12, the debt limit is 
indexed for inflation every three years by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.107  In 2010, the Judicial Conference adjusted the debt limit 
from $3,237,000 to $3,792,650.108  Chapter 12 retained the requirement that a 
percentage of debt must be related to farming operation, but the percentage 
was decreased from eighty percent to fifty percent.109  The eligibility provi-
sions retain the requirement that fifty percent of debtor income must be re-
lated to farming operation, but under the new amendments, debtors may also 
qualify if fifty percent of income from the second and third taxable years 
preceding the year of filing is related to farming operation.110  Finally, family 
fishermen can qualify for Chapter 12 proceedings subject to more stringent 
conditions.111 
Another major modification introduced by the BAPCPA amendments is 
the prohibition of retroactive assessment of disposable income.112  Concern-
ing Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies, the provisions state that prior to confir-
mation of a plan, trustees and unsecured creditors may object if a plan sub-
  
 103. Schneider, supra note 102, at 113-14. 
 104. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109–8, § 1001, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 105. See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text. 
 106. Schneider, supra note 102, at 114 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A), (B) 
(2006)). 
 107. Id. at n.14; see 11 U.S.C. § 104(b). 
 108. Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed 
Under Section 104(A) of the Code, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www 
.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/02/25/2010-3807/revision-of-certain-dollar-
amounts-in-the-bankruptcy-code-prescribed-under-section-104a-of-the-code.  
 109. Schneider, supra note 102, at 114 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)). 
 110. Id. at 114-15 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)). 
 111. Id. at 115 (“[F]amily fisherman are defined and afforded Chapter 12 eligibil-
ity.  This definition mirrors the original requirements contained in the definition of 
family farmer. Family fisherman do not receive the expanded eligibility criteria that is 
afforded to family farmers but remain subject to the pre-reform income and debt stan-
dards in place for family farmers.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(19A) (2006))). 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(2). 
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mitted by a debtor does not provide for all of a debtor’s “projected disposable 
income.”113  Prior to BAPCPA, courts interpreted the term “projected dispos-
able income” in Chapter 12 proceedings to allow for creditors and trustees to 
object to discharge on grounds that a debtor’s actual income exceeded income 
projected in his plan.114  By contrast, in Chapter 13 cases, courts interpreted 
the same term to limit objections to pre-confirmation, forcing use of plan 
modification actions to address subsequent increases in a debtor’s income.115  
As farmers neared the end of the bankruptcy process, the discrepancy caused 
difficulty by creating the onerous task of accounting for income and expenses 
occurring during the life of a plan and further costly litigation, which effec-
tively eliminated the opportunities for a fresh start and continued viability of 
farming operations.116   
Congress enacted three new provisions to rectify the problems caused by 
this discrepancy.117  First, BAPCPA amendments provide that a plan may not 
be modified “to increase the amount of any payment due before the plan as 
modified becomes the plan,” which allows creditors to raise the amount due 
only on payments due after modification of a plan.118  Additionally, the 
amendments further limit modification by stating that a plan may not be 
modified by anyone other than a debtor “to increase the amount of payments 
to unsecured creditors required for a particular month so that the aggregate of 
such payments exceeds the debtor's disposable income for such month.”119  
Finally, reemphasizing the underlying policy of preservation and continuation 
of debtors’ farming operations, the BAPCPA provisions restrict modification 
of a plan “in the last year of the plan by anyone except the debtor, to require 
payments that would leave the debtor with insufficient funds to carry on the 
farming operation after the plan is completed.”120 
d.  11 U.S.C. Section 1222(a)(2)(A) 
The BAPCPA amendments, particularly 11 U.S.C. section 
1222(a)(2)(A), also remove priority status from certain tax obligations.121  
The background of this provision begins with In re Specht and the efforts of 
Senator Chuck Grassley and ends with the enactment BAPCPA. 
  
 113. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B), 1325(b)(1)(B). 
 114. Schneider, supra note 102, at 117 (citing Rowley v. Yarnall, 22 F.3d 190, 
192-93 (8th Cir. 1994)).   
 115. Id. (citing Anderson v. Saterlee (In re Anderson), 21 F.3d 355, 357-58 (9th 
Cir. 1994); In re Bass, 267 B.R. 812, 817-18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001)). 
 116. Id. at 117-18. 
 117. Id. at 118-19. 
 118. 11 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1). 
 119. Id. § 1229(d)(2). 
 120. Id. § 1229(d)(3). 
 121. Id. § 1222(a)(2)(A).  For the definition of priority, see infra note 148 and 
accompanying text. 
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Although unreported, In re Specht122 is noteworthy both because the 
case provides an example of the particular plight of farmers during the bank-
ruptcy process addressed by the provision and because the case inspired a 
proposal by Senator Chuck Grassley that eventually led to implementation of 
section 1222(a)(2)(A).123  John and Carol Specht were farmers seeking relief 
under Chapter 12.124  The Spechts proposed their plan to the bankruptcy court 
for confirmation.125  The Farm Service Agency, one of the Spechts’ creditors, 
objected to the plan because it failed to acknowledge tax consequences aris-
ing from the transfer of eighty acres of land.126  The Spechts argued that the 
transfer was a discharge of indebtedness excludible from gross income under 
the IRC.127  However, the court adhered to precedent and found gain in the 
amount of $150,000 includible in the Spechts’ taxable income.128  Among 
other factors, the tax liability played a role in the court’s conclusion that the 
Spechts’ plan was not feasible.129  The court declined to extend the plan filing 
period, found unreasonable delay, and dismissed the case.130 
The Spechts’ bankruptcy lawyer brought the issue to the attention of 
Senator Grassley, a senator from Iowa, a state where economics and politics 
are heavily influenced by agricultural considerations.131  While many politi-
cians must be informed of constituent concerns, Senator Grassley has an in-
side track as a self-proclaimed family farmer who attempts to bring his “real-
life experience as a family farmer to farm policy.”132  
In 1999, Senator Grassley proposed passage of Safeguarding America’s 
Farms Entering the Year 2000 Act (Safety 2000), which advocated for 
changes that were later implemented with BAPCPA, including making Chap-
  
 122. In re Specht, 1997 Bankr. N.D. Iowa No. 96-21022-DU, available at 
http://www.ianb.uscourts.gov/content/sites/default/files/decisions/19970409-pk-
John_Specht.html. 
 123. Brief of Amici Curiae Donald W. Dawes and Phyllis C. Dawes in Support of 
Petitioners at 33, Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012) (No. 10-875), 2011 
WL 3821040, at *33 [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae Donald W. Dawes and 
Phyllis C. Dawes]; see also 145 CONG. REC. S764 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement 
of Sen. Grassley). 
 124. In re Specht, 1997 Bankr. N.D. Iowa No. 96-21022-DU, at ¶ 2. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. ¶ 3. 
 127. Id. ¶ 14. 
 128. Id. ¶¶ 14-15 (citing Gehl v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 784, 790 (1994), aff’d, 50 
F.3d 12 (8th Cir. 1995) (unpublished)).  
 129. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. 
 130. Id. ¶ 20. 
 131. Brief for Amici Curiae Donald W. Dawes and Phyllis C. Dawes, supra note 
123, at *33; see also Iowa Information, SENATOR CHUCK GRASSLEY OF IOWA, 
http://grassley.senate.gov/iowa/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (emphasizing 
the importance of agriculture in Iowa). 
 132. Biography, SENATOR CHUCK GRASSLEY OF IOWA, http://www 
.grassley.senate.gov/about/Biography.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).  
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ter 12 permanent and expanding its eligibility requirements.133  As a response 
to issues presented by In re Specht, Senator Grassley also included a provi-
sion that recognized the reality that “farmers often face a crushing tax liability 
if they need to sell livestock or land in order to reorganize their business af-
fairs.”134  Because tax claims were given priority in bankruptcy, farmers were 
required to pay tax liability in full over the life of their plans, which rendered 
many plans infeasible.135  In effect, pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy law gave the 
IRS veto power over farmers’ attempts at reorganization.136  The provision in 
the original Safety 2000 proposal effectively denied veto power by removing 
priority of certain taxes and generally remained intact until it was codified by 
BAPCPA.137  
Though many farmers may have benefitted from immediate passage of 
the initial proposal, the necessity for repeated proposals provides a rich legis-
lative history for discerning the legislature’s intended purpose and application 
of the provision, which may be used as guidance for judicial interpretation.  
For instance, in a plea for support for Safety 2000, Senator Grassley ex-
plained that the proposed provision “reduces the priority of capital gains tax 
liabilities for farm assets sold as a part of a reorganization plan” and has “the . 
. . effect of allowing cash-strapped farmers to sell livestock, grain, and other 
farm assets to generate cash-flow when liquidity is essential to maintaining a 
farming operation.”138  Senator Susan Collins, an advocate for inclusion of 
family fishermen in Chapter 12, conveyed a similar understanding of the pro-
vision, stating that “[t]he [C]hapter 12 debtor is also given the freedom to sell 
off parts of his or her property as part of a reorganization plan.”139  Although 
Senator Grassley proposed the revision on many occasions, his explanation 
remained consistent, shown by the senator’s statement made on the eve of 
passage of the BAPCPA amendments that “[t]he bill lets farmers in bank-
ruptcy avoid capital gains tax.  This is very important because it will free up 
resources to be invested in farming operations that otherwise would go down 
the black hole of the Internal Revenue Service.”140  Shortly thereafter, in 
April 2005, the tax priority provision was signed into law.141    
The valiant efforts of Senator Grassley finally culminated in the tax pri-
ority provision’s placement in section 1222, which generally provides the 
  
 133. 145 CONG. REC. S764 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id.; Brief of Amici Curiae Donald W. Dawes and Phyllis C. Dawes, supra 
note 123, at 38. 
 138. 145 CONG. REC. S11093 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Gras-
sley). 
 139. 147 CONG. REC. S2155 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Collins). 
 140. 151 CONG. REC. S1857 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 141. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109–8, § 1001, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
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parameters of a Chapter 12 repayment plan.142  Subsection (b) of section 1222 
provides an illustrative list of options debtors may use in a plan,143 while sub-
section (a) outlines minimum requirements that must be satisfied for plan 
confirmation.144  Briefly, under a Chapter 12 plan, debtors must permit trus-
tees control and supervision over future income to the extent that income is 
necessary to fund a plan.145  Like Chapter 13, subsection (a) also provides 
that debtors generally must provide for full payment of any claims entitled to 
priority under section 507.146   
However, unlike Chapter 13, Chapter 12 provides another exception to 
full payment of priority claims, stating, in relevant part: 
The plan shall . . . provide for the full payment, in deferred cash 
payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507, un-
less . . . the claim is a claim owed to a governmental unit that arises 
as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of 
any farm asset used in the debtor's farming operation, in which 
case the claim shall be treated as an unsecured claim that is not en-
titled to priority under section 507, but the debt shall be treated in 
such manner only if the debtor receives a discharge.147 
Claims by governmental units, usually arising due to unpaid taxes, are 
afforded priority, which means that such claims are granted favorable treat-
ment that varies with respect to the applicable bankruptcy chapter.148  In 
Chapter 11, 12, and 13 proceedings, most priority unsecured claims are either 
expressly nondischargeable or must be paid in full throughout the life of a 
plan.149  Without section 1222(a)(2)(A), tax obligations arising from the sale 
of farm assets would fall under section 523(a)(1)(A), which denies discharge 
of a tax claim “of the kind and for the periods specified” in the Section 507 
provisions generally awarding priority to tax claims.150  However, section 
1222(a)(2)(A) expressly provides that “the claim shall be treated as an unse-
cured claim that is not entitled to priority under section 507 . . . if the debtor 
receives a discharge.”151  In contrast with most priority unsecured claims, 
most general unsecured claims are discharged after successful completion of 
  
 142. 11 U.S.C. § 1222 (2006). 
 143. Id. § 1222(b). 
 144. Id. § 1222(a). 
 145. Id.  If classes are used, debtors must treat each claim or interest within a 
particular class equally unless the holder of a claim agrees otherwise.  Id. § 
1222(b)(1). 
 146. Compare id. § 1222(a)(4), with id. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 147. Id. § 1222(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 148. Id. § 507(a)(8) (Supp. 2011). 
 149. Id. §§ 1129(a)(9)(B), 1222(a)(2), 1228(a)(2), 1322(a)(2), 1328(a)(2) (2006).  
 150. Id. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
 151. Id. § 1222(a)(2)(A). 
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a plan, which frees a debtor of all legal responsibility for the debt.152  Because 
section 1222(a)(2)(A) removes both priority and nondischargeability from tax 
claims arising as a result of disposition of farm assets used in debtors’ farm-
ing operation, Chapter 12 debtors are permitted to discharge tax claims that 
would otherwise be nondischargeable or paid in full during the life of a 
plan.153 
B.  Tax 
It is important to note that section 1222(a)(2) applies by its own terms 
solely to claims that would otherwise receive priority under the bankruptcy 
provisions.154  Specifically, two provisions award priority to tax liabilities.  
First, section 507(a)(8) grants priority to certain taxes arising prior to the fil-
ing of a bankruptcy petition, or pre-petition.155  Section 1222(a)(2) undisput-
edly applies to claims receiving priority under section 507(a)(8).156  Second, 
section 507(a)(2)(A) grants priority to administrative expenses allowed under 
section 503(b),157 which includes any tax “incurred by the estate, whether 
secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which liability is in rem, in 
personam, or both, except a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this 
title.”158  The bankruptcy estate arises upon commencement of a bankruptcy 
case, which occurs when debtors or creditors in Chapter 7 or 11 proceedings 
file a bankruptcy petition.159  Accordingly, taxes incurred by an estate are 
necessarily incurred post-petition. 
  
 152. Id. §§ 1228(a)(1), 1328(a). 
 153. See id. § 1222(a)(2)(A); see also Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 
1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012) (“As unsecured 
claims, the taxes would be entitled to no priority, paid only to the extent funds might 
be available after priority claims were satisfied, and any remaining unpaid portion 
would be eligible for discharge.”); United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012) (“Thus debtors may well treat certain claims 
owed to a governmental unit arising from the sale of farm realty as payable in less 
than full, and dischargeable.”). 
 154. In re Dawes, 652 F.3d at 1238. 
 155. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (Supp. 2011). 
 156. See In re Dawes, 652 F.3d at 1242 (“Yet under our interpretation of § 503(b), 
income taxes incurred as a result of the pre-petition disposition of certain farm assets 
are eligible for § 1222(a)(2)(A)’s generous rule allowing them to be treated as unse-
cured claims, compromised, and discharged.”); Hall, 617 F.3d at 1163 (“Indeed, there 
is no dispute that section 1222(a)(2)(A) allows chapter 12 debtors to treat taxes in-
curred by selling farm assets before the filing of a bankruptcy petition as payable in 
less than full and dischargeable”). 
 157. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 158. Id. § 503(b)(1) (2006). 
 159. Id. § 541(a) (“The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 
of this title creates an estate.”). 
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The issue then becomes whether an estate incurs any taxes, an issue of 
interpretation where reasonable minds may disagree.  Proponents of the view 
that section 1222(a)(2)(A) does not apply to post-petition taxes find support 
in the IRC.160  Particularly, the IRC bases its argument on two complemen-
tary statutes, both signed into law under the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.161  
First, IRC section 1398 treats bankruptcy estates of individual debtors under 
Chapter 7 and 11 as separate taxable entities, imposing additional tax re-
quirements, but also affording debtors certain tax benefits.162  Second, IRC 
section 1399 expressly disallows creation of separate taxable entities or appli-
cation of the special rules to bankruptcy estates of any other debtor.163 
1.  Prelude to IRC Sections 1398-99 
Though the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 included several other impor-
tant provisions,164 the portions relevant to the IRS’s arguments in Hall essen-
tially codified the established stance of the IRS towards bankruptcy debtors 
prior to the adoption of the act.165  In short, legislative action became neces-
sary because of disputes between federal courts and the IRS concerning 
whether the stance taken by the IRS was appropriate. 
Prior to 1980, the IRS’s stance was in response to the interplay between 
the following established principles of law: 1) upon commencement of bank-
ruptcy proceedings, title to all property belonging to a debtor is vested in the 
bankruptcy estate;166 and 2) gross income includes only income over which a 
  
 160. See In re Dawes, 652 F.3d at 1240; Hall, 617 F.3d at 11664 (“The Internal 
Revenue Code provides that a chapter 12 estate cannot incur taxes.”); Knudsen v. 
I.R.S., 581 F.3d 696, 710 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he government’s argument [is] that 
post[-]petition income taxes cannot be ‘incurred by the estate’ because a bankruptcy 
filing under Chapter 12 does not create a separate taxable entity under 26 U.S.C. § 
1399 of the IRC.”), abrogated by Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012). 
 161. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). 
 162. I.R.C. § 1398 (2006). 
 163. I.R.C. § 1399. 
 164. See Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 3389.  Other important provi-
sions include the treatment of discharge of indebtedness for taxpayers in bankruptcy 
or insolvent taxpayers, and G reorganization.  Id. §§ 2, 4. 
 165. James I. Shepard, The Bankruptcy Tax Act and the Bankruptcy Code: A 
Study with Reference to the Distressed Farm Economy, 1986 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 5 
(1986) (“The Treasury Department took the position that the bankruptcy estate was a 
taxable entity, separate from the individual. With the addition of [sections] 1398 and 
1399 to Title 26, the separate entity rules were codified providing a comprehensive 
statutory treatment of these issues, as well as on the question of the treatment of the 
allocation of tax attributes between the estate and the debtor.”). 
 166. Sydney Krause & Arnold Y. Kapiloff, The Bankrupt Estate, Taxable Income 
and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 407 (1966) (“Apparently, 
the rationale of the Treasury Department in applying Subchapter J principles to bank-
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taxpayer has complete dominion.167  Creation of a bankruptcy estate removed 
debtors from complete dominion over income produced by estate assets, 
which meant that taxable income held by estates could not be taxed to debt-
ors.168 
In recognition of this issue, the IRS took the position that the bankruptcy 
estates of individual and partnership debtors were separate taxable entities 
and that “income of a bankrupt partnership's estate, like that of a bankrupt 
individual's estate, should be taxed as income of an estate under section [641] 
of the [IRC].”169  The IRS mandate provided for calculation of estate income 
tax under section 641, which generally “[applied] to the taxable income of 
estates or of any kind of property held in trust,”170 and also required trustees 
to file fiduciary income tax returns on behalf of estates.171  In addition to du-
ties imposed on trustees, the IRS required that debtors file individual income 
tax returns for post-petition income not attributable to estates.172  
However, court decisions were not always consistent with the IRS’s po-
sition.173  For instance, some courts held that because of lack of statutory 
support, trustees in liquidation proceedings were not required to file income 
tax returns for bankruptcy estates, which thwarted collection efforts of the 
IRS.174  By contrast, courts also held that in liquidation proceedings trustees 
  
rupt estates is founded on the premise that legal title to the bankrupt’s property vests 
by operation of law in the trustee.”). 
 167. Comm’r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209 (1990) (“In 
determining what sort of economic benefits qualify as income, this Court has invoked 
various formulations. It has referred, for example, to ‘undeniable accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.’” 
(quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955))). 
 168. H.R. REP. NO. 96-833, at 20 n.2 (1980) (“The rationale for generally treating 
the individual debtor and the bankruptcy estate as separate entities is that the individ-
ual may obtain new assets or earn wages after transfer of the pre-bankruptcy property 
to the trustee and thus derive income independent of that derived by the trustee from 
the transferred assets.”); Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301 (“The basis for this con-
clusion is that the intervention of the status of bankruptcy into the affairs of both an 
individual and a partnership creates an entity separate and apart from the individual or 
partnership bankrupt.”).  
 169. Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301 (quoting I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24617 
(1939)). 
 170. I.R.C. § 641(a) (2006). 
 171. Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301. 
 172. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 166, at 407. 
 173. See GRANT W. NEWTON & GILBERT D. BLOOM, BANKRUPTCY & INSOLVENCY 
TAXATION 24-25 (1991). 
 174. Preston v. United States (In re 4100 N. High Ltd.), 3 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1980) (“[N]either the Bankruptcy Act nor the Internal Revenue Code as 
worded in 1975 and 1976 imposed or levied federal income tax upon bankruptcy 
estates of either individuals or partnerships.”); In re Siehl, Bankr. No. 55648, 1975 
WL 778, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 1975) (“[A]n estate in bankruptcy is not the kind 
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were liable for all federal income taxes incurred by an estate, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. section 690, which provides that any court officer or agent who con-
ducts business under court authority is liable for resulting taxes.175  A similar 
dispute arose concerning reorganization proceedings when courts further 
undermined the IRS by holding that individuals in bankruptcy proceedings 
did not create separate taxable entities and that there was no requirement that 
trustees file fiduciary tax returns. 176 
2.  Sections 1398 and 1399 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Tax Act due to a notable lack 
of “statutory rules governing the tax treatment of debt discharge in bank-
ruptcy and insolvency,” which caused much “confusion and controversy.”177  
In particular, sections 1398 and 1399 were implemented to rectify the ongo-
ing conflict concerning the creation of a separate taxable entity for bank-
ruptcy estates.178 
Section 1398 provides rules relating to tax treatment of estates created 
by individual debtors under Chapters 7 and 11.179  The section treats bank-
ruptcy estates as separate taxable entities and instructs trustees filing a fiduci-
ary return both to include in gross income any income to which an estate is 
entitled under Title 11 and to compute tax liability for estates in the same 
manner as individuals.180  Debtors may also elect to split their taxable year in 
the year of filing into two taxable years, one running from the first day of the 
year until the day before filing and the second running from the day of filing 
until the end of the original taxable year.181  This election allows tax liabilities 
already accrued to be treated as pre-petition debt, which can be paid from 
  
of estate or trust upon which the Congress imposed income tax liability by enactment 
of Section 641 of the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 175. In re 4100 N. High Ltd., 3 B.R. at 239 (“Under the plain and unambiguous 
words of [section] 960, he is subject to all taxes which would have been applicable to 
the business if it had been conducted by an individual or corporation.”); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 960(a) (2006). 
 176. In re Lister, 177 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Va. 1959) (“Certainly it is true that 
two taxable entities are not created under a Chapter XI proceeding, where before only 
one had existed.”); CHM Co. v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 31, 37 (1977) (“The language of the 
Bankruptcy Act itself further supports the view that neither the filing of chapter peti-
tions nor the appointment of a receiver creates a separate and distinct entity.”). 
 177. 126 CONG. REC. H12461 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980) (statement of Rep. Ull-
man). 
 178. NEWTON & BLOOM, supra note 173, at 25. 
 179. I.R.C. § 1398(a) (2006). 
 180. Id. § 1398(c)(1), (e)(1). 
 181. Id. § 1398(d)(2)(A). 
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debtors’ bankruptcy estates.182  Additionally, section 1398 allows tax-free 
transfers of assets between debtors and their estates but requires that such 
transferred assets retain certain tax attributes.183 
By contrast, section 1399 contains a sole provision stating that, 
“[e]xcept in any case to which section 1398 applies, no separate taxable entity 
shall result from the commencement of a case under Title 11 of the United 
States Code.”184  The section denies the requirements and benefits of section 
1398 to bankruptcy estates of corporations, partnerships, or estates arising 
under Chapters 12 or 13.  The rationale for this dichotomy between the es-
tates of Chapter 12 and 13 debtors and Chapter 7 and 11 debtors is that Chap-
ter 12 and 13 debtors retain control over estate assets – making a separate 
taxable entity unnecessary.185 
Accordingly, sections 1398 and 1399 provide a dichotomy for tax treat-
ment of the various bankruptcy estates of individual debtors.  Individual 
debtors proceeding under Chapters 7 and 11 retain the requirement of filing 
individual income tax returns, but trustees must file separate returns on behalf 
of bankruptcy estates and pay taxes from income earned by estates.  By con-
trast, individual debtors filing under Chapters 12 and 13 proceedings have 
sole responsibility for a single filing and for payment of taxes on estate in-
come. 
III.  THE CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
In Knudsen v. I.R.S., the Eighth Circuit held that the bankruptcy provi-
sion extended to post-petition governmental claims.186  However, the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Hall187 and the Tenth Circuit in In re Dawes188 
followed the reasoning of arguments propounded by the IRS concerning the 
  
 182. In re Fleming, 277 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (“If the election is 
made, the debtor’s federal income tax liability for the first short taxable year becomes 
an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate as a claim arising before the bank-
ruptcy filing. Accordingly, the tax liability for that first short taxable year becomes 
collectible from the estate, depending on the availability of estate assets.”). 
 183. I.R.C. § 1398(f), (g), (i). 
 184. Id. § 1399. 
 185. H.R. REP. NO. 96-833, at 20 n.2 (1980) (“In a chapter 13 case, however, both 
future earnings of the debtor and exempt property may be used to make payments to 
creditors, and hence the bankruptcy law does not create the same dichotomy between 
after-acquired assets of the individual debtor and assets of the bankruptcy estate as in 
chapter 7 or chapter 11 cases.”). 
 186. Knudsen v. I.R.S., 581 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Hall v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012). 
 187. United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1882 
(2012). 
 188. Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012). 
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effect of IRC section 1399 and held that the bankruptcy provision did not 
extend to post-petition claims. This Part will discuss these three circuit deci-
sions preceding the Supreme Court of the United States’ grant of certiorari to 
interpret section 1222(a)(2)(A). 
A.  Knudsen v. I.R.S 
The Knudsens, pig farmers and owners of 160 acres of Iowa farmland, 
filed bankruptcy under Chapter 12.189  In their reorganization plan, the Knud-
sens proposed the sale of machinery, equipment, and 120 acres of land to 
facilitate paying their creditors.190  Prudently, “the Knudsens asserted that the 
taxes arising from [the] post-petition sales [qualified] for treatment as an un-
secured claim under [section] 1222(a)(2)(A).”191  As a party in interest, the 
IRS objected to the plan, arguing that the benefits of the provision were lim-
ited to claims that received priority under section 507, and that post-petition 
tax claims did not qualify.192  The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the 
Knudsens on the issue, and the district court affirmed, causing the IRS to seek 
appellate review with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.193 
In the IRS’s attempt to persuade the Eighth Circuit that section 
1222(a)(2)(A) did not apply to the Knudsens’ sale, it argued that Chapter 12 
plans are not binding on the holders of post-petition claims.194  The IRS first 
pointed to section 1227(a), which provided that a confirmed plan is binding 
only on the debtor and “creditors.”195  Because “‘creditor’ is defined as an 
‘entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before 
the order for relief concerning the debtor,’”196 a holder of a post-petition 
claim is not a “creditor,” and therefore, cannot be bound by a Chapter 12 plan 
confirmed under section 1222.197 
Replying to the IRS’s arguments, the court found that section 1222 does 
not mention “creditors,” but refers to “claims,” defined as a “right to pay-
ment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured.”198  The court also held that section 
  
 189. Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 700. 
 190. Id. at 701. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 701-03. 
 194. Id. at 704. 
 195. Id. at 705. 
 196. Id. at 704 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2006)).  An “order for relief . . . 
refers to the commencement of a . . . case” under [s]ection 301 or 302.  NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS § O20 (3d. 
ed. 2011). 
 197. Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 705. 
 198. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)). 
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507(a)(2) grants priority to section 503(b) claims, which may include post-
petition taxes incurred by an estate.199  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
post-petition taxes incurred by a Chapter 12 estate fell within the purview of 
section 1222(a)(2)(A) and that accepting the IRS’s argument would “[fail] to 
take into consideration the specific language of [the statute.]”200 
Next, the IRS turned to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and stated 
that while section 106 included an abrogation of sovereign immunity of gov-
ernmental units with respect to several provisions, including section 1227, the 
Code failed to include such an abrogation for section 1222.201  Because of the 
protections of sovereign immunity, the IRS argued that governmental units 
could be affected by the provisions of section 1222 only to the extent that 
they were bound by the contents of the plan as “creditors” under section 
1227, which rendered section 1222(a)(2)(A) inapplicable to post-petition tax 
claims.202  In response, the court reiterated that whether one is a “creditor” is 
irrelevant under the plain language of section 1222(a)(2)(A).203  In further 
support of its position, the court noted that section 106 contained an express 
waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to section 503, the provision al-
lowing for priority of post-petition claims for taxes incurred by an estate.204 
Finally, to determine whether the Knudsens’ claim qualified as a section 
503(b) priority claim, the court addressed the issue of whether post-petition 
taxes could be “incurred by the estate.”205  Relying on section 1399 of the 
IRC, the IRS proffered that the lack of a separate taxable entity for Chapter 
12 bankruptcies meant that Chapter 12 estates could incur no taxes.206  Rebut-
ting the IRS once again, the court referred to section 1222(a)(2)(A) to estab-
lish that claims must have priority to qualify under the provision.207  Turning 
to section 503, the court stated that the Code afforded priority for “any tax . . . 
incurred by the estate, whether secured or unsecured.”208  Citing a string of 
persuasive authority, the court decided that the phrase “incurred by the estate” 
equated to “incurred post[-]petition.”209  Discounting the IRS’s reliance on 
  
 199. Id. at 706. 
 200. Id. (quoting Dawes v. Nazar (In re Dawes), 415 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2009), rev’d sub nom. Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012)). 
 201. Id. at 707. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 707-08. 
 204. Id. at 708. 
 205. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006)). 
 206. Id. at 710; Brief for the Appellant at 49-50, Knudsen, 581 F.3d 696 (No. 08-
2820), 2008 WL 6896023.  
 207. Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 707-08. 
 208. Id. at 708 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i)). 
 209. Id. at 708-09 (citing W. Va. State Dep’t of Tax & Revenue v. I.R.S. (In re 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.), 37 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Baltimore Ma-
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provisions from the IRC, the court found that the provisions of the Code pro-
vide that estates exists for purposes of bankruptcy, and that the property sold 
by the Knudsens fell within the ambit of their Chapter 12 estate.210  In con-
clusion, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that 
“[section] 1222(a)(2)(A) applies to the post[-]petition sale of farm assets,” 
and instructed the bankruptcy court to confirm the Knudsens’ reorganization 
plan.211 
B.  United States v. Hall 
The Ninth Circuit was faced with similar issues in United States v. 
Hall,212 which was argued and decided less than a year after Knudsen.  Spe-
cifically, upon the timely appeal of the IRS, the court decided the issue of 
“whether and to what extent debtors must pay federal income tax on the gain 
from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings.”213 
Chapter 12 debtors Lynwood and Brenda Hall proposed a plan provid-
ing for the sale of their farm to facilitate the payment of their creditors.214  
The court sustained the IRS’s objection that the plan failed to provide for 
$29,000 in capital gains tax generated by the sale.215  The IRS objected again 
when the Halls amended their plan for treatment of the tax as an unsecured 
claim, and the court also sustained.216  After the district court reversed the 
ruling of the lower court, the IRS appealed its decision to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, arguinh the district court had erred.217 
Despite the fact that the Halls’ arguments closely resembled and relied 
on those presented in Knudsen,218 the IRS persuaded the Ninth Circuit to re-
ject the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit.219  Relying on section 1399 of the 
IRC, the Ninth Circuit decided that “[s]ince the [C]hapter 12 estate is not a 
taxable entity, the [C]hapter 12 estate cannot ‘incur’ a tax.”220  The court con-
ceded that taxes incurred by the estate are necessarily incurred post-petition, 
  
rine Indus., Inc., 344 B.R. 407 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006); In re Pub Dennis of Cumber-
land, Inc., 142 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992)). 
 210. Id. at 709-10. 
 211. Id. at 710, 719. 
 212. United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1882 
(2012). 
 213. Id. at 1162. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1164 (“The Halls primarily rely on Knudsen v. IRS, 581 F.3d 696 (8th 
Cir. 2009), in which chapter 12 debtors proposed a plan to sell farmland and farm 
equipment to fund their reorganization.”). 
 219. Id. at 1166. 
 220. Id. at 1163. 
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but found fault with the notion that taxes incurred by an estate were equiva-
lent to taxes incurred post-petition, providing colorful commentary that “just 
because all apples are fruits does not mean all fruits are apples.”221  Establish-
ing that taxes incurred by an estate were merely a subset of taxes incurred 
post-petition, the court found Knudsen unpersuasive.222 
The Halls also pointed to the Knudsen language, stating that section 
503(b) referred to bankruptcy estates and elaborated that the IRC “should not 
be used to ‘frustrate’ the . . . Code.”223  Again denying the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning, the court responded that the Code failed to provide authority that 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy estates have “the inherent ability to incur taxes.”224  
The court justified its reliance on the IRC by finding that the United States 
Code must be interpreted “as a whole” and that courts must “assume that 
Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”225  The court 
also held that because cross-referencing led the court to its conclusion, the 
plain language of the provision was not controlling.226 
Departing from Knudsen, the Halls next presented legislative history re-
lating to section 503(b) and section 1222, including statements from Senator 
Grassley, one of the main proponents of BAPCPA alterations to Chapter 
12.227  Focusing on the fact that the statements proffered by the Halls pre-
ceded enactment of section 1222(a)(2)(A) by a number of years, the court 
heeded the Supreme Court of the United States’ warning concerning “[attri-
bution of] the views of one Congress to another Congress” and declined to 
read legislative history into the statute.228  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held 
that section 1222(a)(2)(A) did not apply to the sale proposed by the Halls in 
their Chapter 12 plan, reversed the district court’s ruling and upheld the IRS’s 
objection.229 
C.  In re Dawes 
Donald and Phyllis Dawes developed a troubled history with the IRS 
due to their repeated failures to pay taxes.230  The IRS sought and received a 
  
 221. Id. at 1165. 
 222. Id. at 1164-65. 
 223. Id. at 1165 (emphasis omitted). 
 224. Id. at 1166. 
 225. Id. (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1166-67 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 66 (1970), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852; 145 CONG. REC. S764 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement 
of Sen. Grassley)). 
 228. Id. at 1167. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012). 
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judgment against the Dawes.231  However, before execution of the judgment, 
the Dawes declared bankruptcy under Chapter 12.232  With permission from 
the bankruptcy court, the Dawes consummated a post-petition sale of farm-
land, which created additional tax liability.233  Subsequently, the Dawes sub-
mitted a plan in which they proposed to treat the tax claim as unsecured pur-
suant to section 1222(a)(2)(A).234  The IRS objected to the tax treatment, but 
both the bankruptcy and district courts rejected its argument, resulting in an 
appeal by the IRS to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.235 
Making a familiar argument, the Dawes postulated that section 507 af-
fords priority to section 503(b) claims, which include taxes incurred by es-
tates, and thus permitted the Dawes to downgrade the claims of the IRS in 
accordance with section 1222(a)(2)(A).236  The court began by examining the 
plain language of section 503(b) and determined that “one who has ‘incurred’ 
an expense is liable for it.”237  Next, the court explained that the entity liable 
for payment of a tax is the entity that incurred it.238  Noting that the bank-
ruptcy law often relies on federal income tax law, the court found relevant 
authority in section 1399 of the IRC, and concluded that “in Chapter 12 and 
13 bankruptcies, the debtor – not the bankruptcy estate – bears the sole re-
sponsibility for filing and paying post-petition federal income taxes.”239  Ac-
cordingly, despite the admitted “markings of bankruptcy” surrounding the 
transaction creating the liability, the court decided that the resulting tax of the 
Dawes’ post-petition sale was incurred by the Dawes and not by their es-
tate.240 
The Dawes implored the court to follow the reasoning of the Knudsen 
decision, which equated “tax incurred by the estate” with “tax incurred during 
bankruptcy,” but the court declined.241  The court replied that applicability of 
section 503(b) depended on which entity incurred the particular tax liability 
rather than when the tax liability was incurred, and that the conflation of the 
two concepts by the Eighth Circuit was “irreconcilable with the plain lan-
guage of [section] 503(b).”242  Additionally, the court surmised that if the 
drafters of the provision “had wanted to focus on when the tax was incurred 
  
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1238-39. 
 237. Id. at 1239. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. at 1240. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1240-41. 
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rather than by whom – [they] surely knew how to do so,” and provided sev-
eral illustrative examples.243 
The court also supported its conclusion by enumerating the difficulties 
that would be created by the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence.  First, drawing 
upon similarities between Chapter 12 and 13 proceedings and the tax treat-
ment of the respective estates, the court described a Chapter 13 provision that 
allowed “the government the option of having the post-petition taxes incurred 
by the debtor treated as part of the bankruptcy proceeding and dealt with in 
the reorganization plan.”244  The court reasoned that the reading of section 
503 prescribed by the Dawes would render the Chapter 13 provision point-
less.245  Next, the court stated that the Dawes’ reading also led to the conclu-
sion that “the bankruptcy estate would . . . be responsible for paying state 
income taxes incurred during bankruptcy,” a conclusion directly controverted 
by section 346(b), which required assignment of liability in bankruptcy be-
tween debtors and estates for state and local income taxes to follow the as-
signment provided by federal law.246  Consequently, in light of the statutory 
canon that a “statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its pro-
visions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignifi-
cant,” the court declined to adopt Knudsen.247 
Finally, the court dismissed legislative history supporting the Dawes’ 
position, declaring the proffered evidence as unsupportive and declining “to 
engage in the sort of ‘psychoanalysis of Congress’ the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly warned against.”248  Siding with the Ninth Circuit, the court held 
in favor of the IRS and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.249  Prior to 
the resolution of Dawes, the Halls appealed their case to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.250  On June 13, 2011, the Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the circuit split.251  
IV.  THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
While the members of the Supreme Court of the United States likely 
share some of the individual concerns of the parties, the Halls’ case presents 
  
 243. Id. at 1241 (citing various provisions from 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2006)). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1241-42 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)). 
 246. Id. at 1242. 
 247. Id. at 1242-43 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). 
 248. Id. at 1243-44 (quoting United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 
U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 66 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852, 1978 WL 8531; 145 CONG. REC. 
S764 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley)). 
 249. Id. at 1244. 
 250. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hall v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011) 
(No. 10-875), 2010 WL 5535748. 
 251. Hall, 131 S. Ct. 2989. 
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issues unique to the judicial branch.  During oral arguments, the Court an-
nounced its concern that adopting the Halls’ position might have an undesired 
and unexpected impact on the Code’s inner workings due to the complexity 
and interdependency of the Code provisions.252  Another concern of the Court 
was that adoption of the IRS’s interpretation could frustrate the will of the 
legislature, because the interpretation leaves the provision with perplexingly 
minimal “practical value.”253 Although the Court ultimately sided with the 
IRS, it can be reasonably assumed that the Court first searched for a solution 
that would have both given effect to legislative intent and avoided wreaking 
havoc on other statutory law.   
To find such a solution, the Court needed to find sufficient evidence of 
legislative intent, while also contemplating potential irreconcilable conflicts 
between statutory provisions.  In the absence of compatible solutions, the 
Court would have been left with little choice but to adopt the limiting inter-
pretation of the IRS.  An analysis of the substance and validity of the argu-
ments presented by the parties to the Court reveals that such a solution would 
have been possible.  This Part will provide an overview and analysis of the 
arguments presented to the Supreme Court of the United States by the Halls 
and the IRS, respectively. 
A.  The Debtors 
The Halls’ primarily argued that the legislature, in enacting section 
1222(a)(2)(A), intended to transform the tax consequences arising from post-
petition dispositions of farm assets into unsecured claims.  To support the 
argument, the Halls relied on the plain language of the statute, the legislative 
history of the provision, and the practical effect of the interpretation of the 
provision proffered by the IRS. 
1.  Plain Language 
The Halls’ found support in the plain language of section 
1222(a)(2)(a).254  The provision refers to “claims,”255 defined by the Code as 
“right[s] to payment.”256  By contrast, the related definition of “creditor” is 
defined as an entity holding a pre-petition claim.257  If Congress intended for 
“claims” to be limited to pre-petition debts, then most of the definition for 
  
 252. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 
(2012) (No. 10-875), 2011 WL 5930687, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-875.pdf. 
 253. Id. at 31-32. 
 254. Brief for Petitioners at *10-22, Hall, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (No. 10-875), 2011 WL 
3706112. 
 255. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 256. Id. § 101(5)(A). 
 257. Id. § 101(10)(A). 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/6
File: MartinPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 10:13 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM 
2013] TAX FORGIVENESS PROVISION 271 
 
“creditor” would be superfluous.  It is axiomatic that the judiciary generally 
disfavors interpretations rendering statutory language superfluous.258  Ac-
cordingly, where provisions of the Code use “claims,” it is more likely that 
the Court will construe the drafters’ intended application for such provisions 
to include both pre-petition and post-petition debts. 
The language of section 503, particularly the phrase “incurred by the es-
tate,” also supported the Halls’ position.259  While the Code does not define 
the term “estate”,260 several Code provisions use “estate” in a way that clearly 
refers to bankruptcy estates.261 The fact that there is no shortage of provisions 
using “estate” to refer to bankruptcy estates stands in sharp contrast to the 
single provision identified by the IRS that uses “estates” to refer to separate 
taxable entities.262  
Notably, the phrase “incurred by the estate” found in section 503 arose 
from judicial construction of prior bankruptcy acts.  First, in Nicholas v. 
United States, the Supreme Court found that taxes incurred during the post-
petition, pre-confirmation period were administrative expenses and were af-
forded first priority under a predecessor of section 503(b).263  A few years 
later, Congress codified the sentiment expressed in Nicholas during the pas-
sage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.264  Subsequently, in United States v. 
  
 258. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011) (“Interpreting 
the statute to require a threshold determination of eligibility ensures that the term 
‘applicable’ carries meaning, as each word in a statute should.”). 
 259. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *15. 
 260. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
 261. For instance, section 541 creates a bankruptcy estate upon the commence-
ment of a case, and brings practically all property of debtors owned at the time of 
filing into the estate.  11 U.S.C. § 541; Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 
642 (1992) (“When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all of his property becomes 
property of a bankruptcy estate.”).  Another provision broadens Chapter 12 estates to 
include “all property of the kind specified in [section 541] . . . after the commence-
ment of the case but before the case is closed.”  11 U.S.C. § 1207(a). 
 262. Brief for the United States at 35-37, Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 
(2012) (No. 10-875), 2011 WL 4352236, at *35-37. 
 263. 384 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1966) (“[T]axes incurred during the arrangement 
period are expenses of the Chapter XI proceedings and are therefore technically a part 
of the first priority under s (64)a(1)”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *17. 
 264. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 193 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6153, 1977 WL 9628 (“In addition to the general tax priority provided under law and 
under H.R. 8200, certain other taxes are entitled to priority.  Taxes arising from the 
operation of the estate after bankruptcy are entitled to priority as administrative ex-
penses.  H.R. 8200 makes no change in this policy, and codifies the result.”); S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852, 1978 WL 
8531 (“In general, administrative expenses include taxes which the trustee incurs in 
administering the debtor’s estate, including taxes on capital gains from sales of prop-
erty by the trustee and taxes on income earned by the estate during the case.  Interest 
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Noland, the Court’s position remained constant when it reiterated that under 
section 503, a post-petition tax “should receive the priority of an administra-
tive expense.”265  Noland is particularly significant for two reasons.   First, 
Noland was decided well after the rise of the Bankruptcy Tax Act;266 second, 
the debtors in Noland were corporate debtors and thus outside the purview of 
the Bankruptcy Tax Act and section 1398.267  Thus, Noland implies that post-
petition taxes can be administrative expenses in the absence of a separate 
taxable entity.268  Upon the enactment of BAPCPA, the wording of section 
503 remained substantially similar to that of the 1978 act.269 
The IRS retorted that Nicholas and Noland dealt with corporate debtors 
rather than individual debtors.270  It found the distinction significant in light 
of the fact that the estate of a corporate debtor can be liable for post-petition 
taxes despite exclusion under sections 1398 and 1399 and the fact that the 
Halls were individual debtors.271  It argued that corporate debtors can incur 
taxes under section 6012(b)(3), which requires a bankruptcy trustee to file 
federal income tax returns for such debtors.272  In short, the IRS argued that 
the taxes in Nicholas and Noland were incurred by the estate by way of sec-
tion 6012, and thus, the Halls’ reliance on the cases was misplaced.273  
In essence, the IRS equated the duty of a trustee to file an income tax re-
turn for a bankrupt corporation to the estate incurring tax liability.  The IRS’s 
view would permit Chapter 12 corporate debtors to benefit more from section 
1222(a)(2)(A) than individual Chapter 12 debtors.274  However, accepting the 
argument as true produces a result with little rationale and an unintended 
incentive for Chapter 12 individual or partnership debtors to incorporate.  
Additionally, upon closer review of Nicholas and Noland, section 6012 may 
not be as relevant to section 503 as the IRS suggested.  First, in Noland, no 
reference to section 6012 is made throughout the opinion.275   Even more 
  
on tax liabilities and certain tax penalties incurred by the trustee are also included in 
this first priority.”). 
 265. 517 U.S. 535, 541 (1996). 
 266. The Bankruptcy Tax Act was passed in 1980.  Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980).  Noland was decided in 1996.  Noland, 517 
U.S. 535. 
 267. Noland, 517 U.S. at 536. 
 268. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *16-17. 
 269. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 1978).  
 270. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *29-30. 
 271. Id. at 26. 
 272. I.R.C. § 6012(b)(3) (2006). 
 273. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *29-30. 
 274. See I.R.C. § 6012(b)(3); Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *22-
23 (stating that a duty to file a tax return on behalf of the estate means that the estate 
incurs taxes). 
 275. See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996). 
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convincingly, Nicholas does discuss section 6012.276  However, it does so in a 
section separate from the preceding section discussing whether post-petition 
taxes were administrative expenses and does so explicitly as a separate is-
sue.277  In effect, Nicholas shows that the Court was aware of section 6012 
yet declined to find the provision relevant in establishing an administrative 
priority.  Finally, while the Code does refer to section 1398,278 providing 
some basis for the argument that section 1398 was incorporated into the 
Code, no such reference is made to section 6012.279 
The plain language of section 1222(a)(2)(A) and section 503 supports 
the conclusion that post-petition taxes are administrative expenses.  Further, 
to the extent that section 503 is ambiguous, there is substantial context pro-
vided by other Code provisions and Supreme Court case law to support the 
position of the Halls and the conclusion that section 1222(a)(2)(A) provides 
relief to farmers from post-petition taxes. 
2.  Legislative History 
Next, the Halls relied on the statements of the intended purpose of the 
provision provided by Senator Grassley, which are replete throughout the 
legislative history.280  From early 1999 until the passage of BAPCPA, the 
record reflects his tenacious and consistent efforts to assist farmers in avoid-
ing the plight of the Spechts.281  During the same period, “no legislative his-
tory” concerning the provision existed to directly support  the position of the 
IRS – “that [s]ection 1222(a)(2)(A) was intended to apply only to pre[-
]petition” dispositions.282  
The IRS responded by noting that the legislative history provided by the 
debtors was merely evidence “as to what one legislator thought that this [pro-
vision] would do.”283  However, the relevant legislative history is not as lim-
ited as the IRS suggests.   Senator Susan Collins was also on record speaking 
about the issue.284  On other occasions, other members of Congress signed 
and approved writings of Senator Grassley concerning the function of the 
provision.285  The IRS also argued that reference to legislative history was 
inappropriate because “the Bankruptcy Code provisions at issue” were unam-
biguous “when read together with the pertinent provisions of the [IRC]” and 
  
 276. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 693 n.27 (1966). 
 277. Id. at 693. 
 278. 11 U.S.C. § 346; I.R.C. § 1398. 
 279. See 11 U.S.C. § 346. 
 280. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *23-28. 
 281. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text. 
 282. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *26. 
 283. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 252, at 31. 
 284. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 285. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *26. 
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that floor statements are unreliable.286  Even stipulating the truth of that con-
tention, the IRS’s argument merely assumed that the Code should be read 
together with the IRC.  It is precisely that assumption that is ambiguous and 
renders reference to legislative history appropriate.  
The IRS also contended that floor statements were unreliable and “views 
of one Congress ordinarily should not be attributed to another.”287  The con-
sistency and repetition contained in the relevant legislative history effectively 
rebuts the IRS’s argument based on the bare assertion that floor statements 
are unreliable.288  To support the IRS’s argument concerning the attribution of 
views from one Congress to another, it relied on two Supreme Court deci-
sions: Massachusetts v. EPA and Doe v. Chao.289  In Massachussetts v. EPA, 
the Court refused to consider post-enactment legislative statements during the 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act.290  In Doe v. Chao, the Court declined to 
consider certain pre-enactment legislative history concerning the Privacy Act 
of 1974.291  However, the Chao court consulted other legislative history to 
reach that decision.292  In particular, the Court found it relevant that the omit-
ted legislative history supported the legislative intent for a statutory mecha-
nism that was subsequently and intentionally deleted from the final draft.293  
While the Court occasionally expresses reluctance to attribute the views of 
one Congress to another, such concern is misplaced in light of the fact that 
legislative history relied on by the Halls was not post-enactment, nor was 
there any contradictory legislative history. 
Finally, the IRS stated that the available legislative history did not ex-
pressly address whether post-petition taxes were administrative expenses in 
Chapter 12 bankruptcies.294  Even if there was no support in BAPCPA or 
Chapter 12’s legislative history for the contention that post-petition taxes are 
administrative expenses, the legislative history from the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978 evidenced intent to codify the common law treatment of post-petition 
taxes as administrative expenses.295  Section 503 became the vehicle for this 
codification and remained largely unchanged despite extensive BAPCPA 
amendments.296  While the legislative history is sparse concerning the me-
  
 286. Brief for the United States, supra 262, at *31-32. 
 287. Id. at *32 (citing Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 529-530 (2007)). 
 288. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text. 
 289. Brief for the United States, supra 262, at *32. 
 290. 549 U.S. at 529-30. 
 291. 540 U.S. 614, 626-27 (2004).  
 292. Id. at 622-23. 
 293. Id. at 622 (“This inference from the terms of the Commission’s mandate is 
underscored by drafting history showing that Congress cut out the very language in 
the bill that would have authorized any presumed damages.”). 
 294. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *32. 
 295. Supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
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chanics of section 1222(a)(2)(A), even less support existed in the legislative 
history to strengthen the position of the IRS.297 
Though there are times when the consideration of legislative history is 
wholly inappropriate, it is difficult to argue convincingly that the legislative 
history of section 1222(a)(2)(A) in this matter was either irrelevant or unreli-
able.  Concededly, other factors may also prove relevant and may even carry 
greater relative weight than legislative history.  However, in the instant case, 
there is little reason to dismiss the pertinent legislative record. 
3.  Practical Effect of the IRS’s Interpretation 
Finally, to further illustrate legislative intent, the Halls’ indicated that 
adopting the IRS’s interpretation would substantially limit the practical effect 
of section 1222(a)(2)(A).298  The term “pre-petition” denotes the period end-
ing immediately prior to filing bankruptcy petitions,299 and the term “post-
petition” refers to the period beginning immediately after such filings.300  
Accordingly, while one might assume that the IRS’s interpretation would 
only limit the effect of the provision to pre-petition transactions, upon closer 
review, the IRS’s interpretation was substantially more constraining.  
The additional constraint is a result of case law and responsive legisla-
tion that culminated to extend pre-petition taxes to those incurred beyond the 
date of filing to the end of the taxable year in which the filing occurred.  Prior 
to BAPCPA, dissension among the circuits arose over interpreting a former 
version of the provision.301  The conflict centered on the treatment of tax 
  
 297. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *26.  
 298. Id. at *32-33. 
 299. See Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co. (In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe 
Co.), 64 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that “pre[-]petition income” was 
income of debtors earned before the date of bankruptcy filing). 
 300. See id. (stating that “post[-]petition income” was income of debtors earned 
after the date of bankruptcy filing). 
 301. See In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (11th Cir. 
1997) (interpreting section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) “to address taxes derived from pre[-
]petition events ‘not assessed before, but assessable . . . after, the commencement of 
the case’”); In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d at 1150-51 (finding that subsection 
(iii) “can be read . . . to address only pre[-]petition taxable activity or events”); Pac.-
Atl. Trading Co. v. United States (In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 1292, 1301 
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding “that a tax on income should be treated as ‘incurred’ on the 
last day of the taxable period”). 
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claims arising from the year that bankruptcy petitions were filed,302 com-
monly referred to as the “straddle year.”303   
Before the revision of section 507(a)(8), the parsing of the prior version 
resulted in ambiguity concerning whether tax claims arising during the strad-
dle year were pre-petition or post-petition, and, relatedly, whether such 
claims were administrative expenses or lower priority claims.304  The relevant 
portion of the provision states that claims for income tax “not assessed be-
fore, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, after the com-
mencement of the case” were entitled to seventh priority (now eighth).305  By 
its plain language, the provision awarded seventh priority to claims for taxes 
not only during the straddle year but also during all subsequent post-petition 
years, as each subsequent year’s tax was “assessable, under applicable law . . 
  
 302. In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d at 1148 (“The particular question pre-
sented here is whether the portions of MDOR’s corporate income tax claims that 
relate solely to the income of the debtors earned before the date they filed for bank-
ruptcy (‘pre[-]petition income’) qualify as administrative expense claims under 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).”).  
 303. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *29. 
 304. The pre-revision version stated: 
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of gov-
ernmental units, only to the extent that such 
claims are for- 
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross 
receipts- 
(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the 
date of filing of the petition for which a return, 
if required, is last due, including extensions, 
after three years before the date of the filing of 
the petition; 
(ii) assessed within 240 days, plus any time 
plus 30 days during which an offer in com-
promise with respect to such tax that was made 
within 240 days after such assessment was 
pending, before the date of the filing of the pe-
tition; or 
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in sec-
tion 523(a)(1)(B) or 523(a)(1)(C) of this title, 
not assessed before, but assessable, under ap-
plicable law or by agreement, after the com-
mencement of the case. 
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988), amended by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).   
After BAPCPA, certain familial obligations became first priority and preexisting 
priority categories were downgraded accordingly.  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 119 Stat 23. 
 305. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988). 
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. after the commencement of the case.”306  The IRS and federal courts reached 
a consensus on the absurdity of the plain language interpretation, because it 
would remove all income taxes from the higher priority afforded by adminis-
trative expense status.307  
Realizing that the courts would be forced to go against plain language, 
the IRS argued that the provision should be interpreted as referring to “taxes 
that were assessable both before and after the filing,”308 which would charac-
terize all claims for taxes during the straddle year as administrative ex-
penses.309  Most courts rejected the IRS’s view as without merit based upon 
findings that the section 507(a)(7) primarily dealt with pre-petition claims, 
and that the administrative expense provision explicitly excluded them from 
the scope of section 507(a)(7).310  Rather than adopting the IRS’s self-serving 
interpretation, the courts adopted an interpretation that split claims for taxes 
incurred during the straddle year; taxes incurred post-petition were treated as 
administrative expenses, and taxes incurred pre-petition were afforded lower 
priority.311 
While courts were reluctant to adopt the IRS’s view, Congress was not, 
and altered the provision with the passage of BAPCPA.312  The revision 
  
 306. Id.  
 307. See In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (11th Cir. 
1997) (“The Government asserts that we cannot adhere to the statute’s plain language 
because its application leads to ‘absurd’ results.  For example, a plain reading of ‘not 
assessed before, but assessable after’ would also exclude from administrative priority 
the portion of the year’s tax that Debtors did pay, i.e., the portion attributable to in-
come earned during the post[-]petition period . . . . Similarly, the plain reading would 
exclude from administrative priority the income taxes for tax years that both begin 
and end post[-]petition.”). 
 308. In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d at 1395 (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 309. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *29. 
 310. See In re Hillsborough Holdings, 116 F.3d at 1395; Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co. (In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co.), 64 F.3d 1146, 1151 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1995); Pac.-Atl. Trading Co. v. United States (In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 
1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 311. In re Hillsborough Holdings, 116 F.3d at 1395-96 (“We believe that subsec-
tion (iii) can be read, like the other subsections of 507(a)(7)(A) to address only pre[-
]petition taxable activity or events.” (citing In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d at 
1151)); In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co., 64 F.3d at 1304 (“[W]e hold that PATCO’s 1988 
income tax liability for income earned prior to the granting of the order for relief and 
the appointment of the Trustee on October 31, 1988 does not qualify as an administra-
tive expense.”). 
 312. The relevant provision states:  
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of gov-
ernmental units, only to the extent that such 
claims are for –  
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changed the parsing of the provision to provide a clear indication of legisla-
tive intent for excluding taxes incurred during the straddle year from eighth 
priority,313 which allowed for them to be characterized as administrative ex-
penses.314  In sum, the BAPCPA revision of section 507(a)(8) permits only 
taxes incurred during a tax year that has ended prior to the filing of the peti-
tion to be eighth priority claims. 
Notably, section 1398(d)(2) of the IRC alleviates the impact of the nar-
row section 507(a)(8) characterization for individual Chapter 7 and 11 debt-
ors by allowing bifurcation of the tax year in which a bankruptcy petition is 
filed.315  The bifurcation allows income taxes incurred in that tax year to be-
come priority claims, which must be paid to the extent that funds are avail-
able in liquidation proceedings.316  Section 1398(d)(2) benefits debtors by 
allowing liquidation funds to satisfy tax liabilities that would otherwise sur-
vive the bankruptcy proceedings, rather than general unsecured claims, which 
  
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross 
receipts for a taxable year ending on or before 
the date of the filing of the petition –  
(i) for which a return, if required, is last due, 
including extensions, after three years before 
the date of the filing of the petition; 
(ii) assessed within 240 days before the date of 
the filing of the petition, exclusive of –  
(I) any time during which an offer in compro-
mise with respect to that tax was pending or in 
effect during that 240-day period, plus 30 
days; and 
(II) any time during which a stay of proceed-
ings against collections was in effect in a prior 
case under this title during that 240-day period, 
plus 90 days; or 
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in sec-
tion 523(a)(1)(B) or 523(a)(1)(C) of this title, 
not assessed before, but assessable, under ap-
plicable law or by agreement, after, the com-
mencement of the case. 
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (Supp. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 313. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 254, at *30; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-
31(I), at 43 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 115, 2005 WL 832198 (“Un-
der current law, certain expenses and the priority of claims reduce the funds that 
would otherwise be available to pay tax liens on property.  The act would increase the 
priority of those liens in certain circumstances against certain expenses and claims, 
thereby making it more likely that funds would remain available to cover tax obliga-
tions.”). 
 314. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (stating that administrative expenses 
cannot be “a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title”). 
 315. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
 316. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8), 726(a)(1). 
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are typically dischargeable.317  Unfortunately, Chapter 12 debtors are pre-
cluded from the use of section 1398(d)(2).318 
To illustrate the effect of the provision on Chapter 12 debtors, assume 
that Debtor, a calendar year taxpayer and a Chapter 12 debtor, files his bank-
ruptcy petition on November 1, 2010.  Section 507(a)(8) limits pre-petition 
status, and thus, eighth priority, to claims for taxes incurred during 2009 and 
prior years, because taxes for subsequent years are not taxes “for a taxable 
year ending on or before the date of the filing of the petition.”  Conversely, a 
claim for tax incurred during 2010 is considered a post-petition claim.  Ac-
cordingly, if Debtor was a Chapter 12 family farmer in a jurisdiction that has 
adopted the IRS’s interpretation of section 1222(a)(2)(A), Debtor would have 
been required to sell farm equipment on or before December 31, 2009, or 305 
days prior to filing, for the taxes to qualify as pre-petition and for Debtor to 
benefit from section 1222(a)(2)(A).  
The effect of the straddle year presents numerous problematic conse-
quences.  First, farmers that file in the second half of a tax year may have 
already paid their income taxes, rendering section 1222(a)(2)(A) useless.  
Second, without the help of legal advice, the disposition of farm equipment 
well in advance of filing of a bankruptcy petition could only occur as a matter 
of happenstance.  Finally, even farmers who are aware of the limited effect of 
the provision would have difficulty taking advantage of it given the dire 
straits that face most individuals considering bankruptcy.  For example, by 
filing their petition for bankruptcy, the Halls sought the refuge of the auto-
matic stay to delay the foreclosure on their farm.319  Had the Halls waited 
until the next year to file for bankruptcy, the Halls would have lost their farm 
in a foreclosure sale.  Further, valuable equity in the farm would be lost for 
the payment of other creditors, because the urgent nature of foreclosure sales 
outside of the bankruptcy court’s supervision results in the likelihood that 
such sales would result in less than market value prices.320  Such results are 
not only disastrous for debtors, but also violate a fundamental purpose of 
bankruptcy: fair and orderly distribution to creditors.321  Because of its lim-
ited practical application, the IRS’s interpretation is difficult to reconcile with 
the very enactment of section 1222(a)(2)(A). 
  
 317. See id. §§ 523(a)(1)(A), 727(b). 
 318. I.R.C. §§ 1398(a). 
 319. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 254, at *32. 
 320. Id. 
 321. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5836, 1978 WL 8531 (“The automatic stay also provides creditor protection.  Without 
it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s 
property.  Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to 
and to the detriment of other creditors.  Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly 
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally.  A race of dili-
gence by creditors for the debtor’s assets prevents that.”). 
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The IRS attempted to rebut this argument by pointing to a few examples 
of debtors who benefitted from the use of section 1222(a)(2)(A) even under 
the IRS’s limited interpretation.322  The IRS also contended that if Congress 
had intended to incorporate into the provision the meaning offered by the 
Halls, it did so incorrectly.323  In particular, the IRS pointed to section 1305 
as a potential model, which states in relevant part: 
(a) A proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim 
against the debtor –  
(1) for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while 
the case is pending . . . . 
(b) . . . a claim filed under subsection (a) of this section shall be al-
lowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title . . . the same as 
if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion.324 
However, the IRS failed to address the issues presented by using the 
framework of section 1305 to carry out the purposes of section 1222(a)(2)(A).  
First, the functions of section 1305 and section 1222(a)(2)(A) as interpreted 
by the Halls are far from identical.  Section 1305 allows government entities 
to file claims in Chapter 13 cases for taxes that arise not only post-petition but 
also those arising post-confirmation.325  In their Supreme Court brief, the 
Halls’ arguments limited the operation of section 1222(a)(2)(A) to the post-
petition and pre-confirmation period.326  Second, borrowing from section 
1305 is necessary only if post-petition taxes are not administrative expenses.  
Certainly, Congress could take section 1305 and adapt the language to meet 
its section 1222(a)(2)(A) needs by changing “while the case is pending” to 
“up until the plan is confirmed.”  However, in doing so, Congress would be 
making a tacit concession that post-petition taxes are not administrative ex-
  
 322. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 252, at 32. 
 323. Id. at 45-46. 
 324. 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006). 
 325. See In re King, 217 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that 
dismissal of Chapter 13 debtor for failure to pay post-confirmation taxes was appro-
priate); In re Bennett, 200 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (same). 
 326. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *41 (“The case before the Court does 
not concern post[-]petition earnings that arguably vested back in the individual debtor 
upon plan confirmation.  It concerns taxes incurred on account of the disposition 
before plan confirmation of real property that was clearly part of the bankruptcy es-
tate, and the capital gains income tax that arose pre[-]confirmation on account of that 
transaction.”). 
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penses, which would upset Supreme Court precedent and may result in unin-
tended and unanticipated consequences elsewhere in the Code.327 
In sum, the Halls’ argument that section 1222(a)(2)(A) applied to claims 
for post-petition taxes was supported by the language of both sections 503 
and 1222.  In particular, the Halls provided evidence that section 503 was 
intended to codify prior case law characterizing post-petition taxes as admin-
istrative expenses.328  Legislative history also lends credibility to the Halls’ 
contentions,329 and although there are many potential issues when relying on 
legislative history for statutory interpretation, such issues are inapplicable to 
the case at hand.  Finally, the Halls’ argument was further enhanced by the 
impractical implications of accepting the IRS’s interpretation as true.330 
B.  The Internal Revenue Service 
The majority of the IRS’s arguments against the characterization of 
post-petition taxes as priority claims in Chapter 12 cases are based on the 
premise that the United States Code and the Bankruptcy Code must be read as 
a whole.  First, the IRS argued that section 1222(a)(2)(A) does not apply to 
administrative expenses under section 507(a)(2), including post-petition 
taxes.331  If true, the argument would render section 1222(a)(2)(A) inapplica-
ble to post-petition taxes because no Code provision other than section 
507(a)(2) affords post-petition taxes the requisite priority.  Second, the IRS 
argued that even if section 1222(a)(2)(A) applies to administrative expenses, 
post-petition taxes in Chapter 12 cases are not administrative expenses.332  
Similarly, the acceptance of this argument would render section 
1222(a)(2)(A) inapplicable to post-petition taxes. 
1.  Section 1222(a)(2)(A) Inapplicable to Administrative Expenses 
The IRS contended that section 1222(a)(2)(A) did not apply to adminis-
trative expenses and pointed to several Code sections to support its position, 
including sections 1222, 1226, 1227, and 1305.  First, the IRS argued that 
section 1222(a)(2)’s plain language made it inapplicable to administrative 
  
 327. See id. (“Given the multi-year nature of an individual's plan, courts have 
analyzed the postconfirmation status of debtor earnings and income tax liability in 
various ways, with the majority concluding that only property necessary to plan im-
plementation is property of the estate after plan confirmation and protected by the 
automatic stay, and the remainder vests back in the debtor.” (citing Telfair v. First 
Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000); Heath v. U.S. Postal Serv. 
(In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 328. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 329. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 330. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 331. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *7-8. 
 332. Id. at *8-11. 
39
Martin: Martin: Farmer and the Tax Man
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: MartinPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 10:13 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM 
282 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
expenses.333  Section 1222(a)(2) dictates that a Chapter 12 plan must provide 
for the full payment of all claims entitled to priority and allows an exception 
for certain “claim[s] owed to a governmental unit.”334  The IRS noted that 
section 1222(a)(2)(A) uses the word “claims,” and makes reference to section 
507.335  Section 507(a) grants priority to ten categories of “expenses and 
claims.”336  Nine of the categories concern types of debts that arise pre-
petition, and consistently throughout section 507(a), these categories of debts 
are referred to as “claims.”337  One category, section 507(a)(2), refers to ad-
ministrative “expenses” and describes a category of debt that necessarily 
arises post-petition including “taxes incurred by the estate.”338  The IRS 
found the dichotomy of section 507(a) significant in the interpretation of sec-
tion 1222(a)(2), arguing that the dichotomy between “expenses” and “claims” 
drawn in section 507(a) and the reference made by section 1222(a)(2) to sec-
tion 507 can only mean that section 1222(a)(2)(A) also adopts that dichot-
omy.339  Thus, the fact that the plain language of section 1222(a)(2)(A) af-
fords special treatment to “claims” means that section 1222(a)(2) cannot be 
interpreted to afford special treatment to post-petition taxes.340 
The Code defines a “claim” as a “right to payment” and does not define 
“expenses.”341  To its credit, the IRS provided legislative history from the Act 
of 1978 evidencing intent to create a dichotomy between “claims” and “ex-
penses” in section 507.342  On the other hand, both parties agreed that the 
Code is inconsistent and often refers to administrative expenses as claims.343 
Further weakening the arguments of the IRS, no legislative history indicated 
intent to incorporate that dichotomy into section 1222(a)(2)(A).344  Ulti-
mately, although the IRS’s argument was not completely without merit, in-
consistency in the Code robbed the argument of much of its persuasive value. 
Next, the IRS contended that section 1226(b)(1) indicates that adminis-
trative expenses are to be paid outside of the plan,345 which is relevant be-
cause section 1222 only applies to claims covered by Chapter 12 plans.346  
Section 1226(b)(1) states that, “[b]efore or at the time of each payment to 
  
 333. Id. at *13-15. 
 334. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 335. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *13. 
 336. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
 337. Id. § 507(a)(1), (3)-(10). 
 338. Id. §§ 503(b)(1)(B)(i), 507(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 339. See Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *13-14. 
 340. See id. at *14.  
 341. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006). 
 342. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *14 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-
1106 (1978)). 
 343. Compare id., with Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 252, at 16.  
 344. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *26.  
 345. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *15-17. 
 346. Id. at *16; see 11 U.S.C. § 1222. 
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creditors under the plan, there shall be paid . . . any unpaid claim of the kind 
specified in section 507(a)(2) of this title.”347  The argument is that if admin-
istrative expenses are separate from a Chapter 12 plan, then section 
1222(a)(2)(A) cannot remove priority from administrative expenses.348  To 
the contrary, the IRS argued, the provision has the effect of granting “super-
priority” over other priority claims because the administrative expenses must 
be paid before other claims in the Chapter 12 plan.349 
The IRS failed to recognize that section 1226(b)(1) and section 
1222(a)(2)(A) can and should be read together harmoniously.  The differ-
ences in the words used in each provision are significant.  While section 
1222(a)(2)(A) refers to “claims entitled to priority under section 507,”350 sec-
tion 1226(b)(1) refers to “claim[s] of the kind specified in section 
507(a)(2).”351  Section 1226(b)(1) uses that language rather than the language 
of section 1222(a)(2)(A) to purposefully signify that section 1226(b)(1) 
claims are not claims entitled to priority under section 507(a)(2), but instead 
are merely claims “of the kind.”352  Such claims are merely “of the kind” 
because section 507(a)(2) claims are limited to pre-confirmation expenses,353 
and section 1226(b)(1) deals solely with post-confirmation expenses.354  
Thus, under this reading of the statutory language, administrative expenses 
are not dealt with under section 1226(b)(1), and there is no conflict with the 
interpretation of section 1222(a)(2)(A) proposed by the Halls. 
Similarly, the IRS asserted that according to section 1227, a Chapter 12 
plan is binding only on “creditors,”355 which is defined as an “entity that has a 
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for re-
lief.”356  Section 1227 stands in contrast to section 503(a), which provides 
that “[a]n entity may timely file a request for payment of an administrative 
expense.”357 The IRS’s contention was that if Chapter 12 plans bind only 
creditors and section 1222 concerns the contents of a Chapter 12 plan, then 
the provisions of section 1222 bind only creditors.358  The IRS also contended 
  
 347. 11 U.S.C. § 1226(b)(1). 
 348. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *15-16. 
 349. Id. at *16. 
 350. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2). 
 351. Id. § 1226(b)(1). 
 352. Id.   
 353. Supra notes 314-15, 326-28 and accompanying text. 
 354. See 7 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 
135:10 (3d ed. 2012) (“If the Chapter 12 plan is confirmed, Code § 1226(b)(1) re-
quires that ‘[b]efore or at the time of’ each plan payment to creditors, there must be 
paid any unpaid claim specified in Code § 507(a)(2), which includes administrative 
expenses allowed under § 503(b) and fees or charges against the estate.”). 
 355. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *12-13. 
 356. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(10)(A), 1227. 
 357. Id. § 503(a) (emphasis added). 
 358. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *12-13. 
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that creditors are defined by the Code as entities with pre-petition claims, and 
administrative expenses are only incurred post-petition; therefore, section 
1222(a)(2) cannot remove priority from post-petition taxes.359 
The Halls conceded this point but also offered a contradictory one.360  
Section 1228(a) states that after a debtor completes all payments under a plan, 
“the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the 
plan allowed under section 503.”361  The debts categorized under section 503 
would be administrative expenses.362  Accordingly, the Code contemplates 
that administrative expenses, which are by definition post-petition, are pro-
vided for within the plan and discharged near the end of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 
While the Supreme Court has the power to strike down inherently con-
tradictory statutes, it is reluctant to do so if plausible harmonious interpreta-
tions exist.363  Thus, it is important to note that the IRS misstated the effect of 
section 1227.  While section 1227 fails to mention that a plan may be binding 
on post-petition claim holders, it also does not expressly limit the binding 
power of the plan to creditors and other enumerated entities.364  Therefore, to 
adopt the position that the plan is also binding on some post-petition claim 
holders would not be inconsistent with section 1227.  By contrast, section 
1228 affirmatively indicates that post-petition claims are accounted for in the 
plan and may be discharged.365  Significantly, adoption of the IRS’s position 
that the plan was not binding on post-petition claim holders would directly 
contradict section 1228.  
Finally, according to the IRS, the effect of section 1222(a)(2)(A) was 
called into question by section 1305,366 which provides that “[a] proof of 
claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor . . . for 
taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending,” 
and that such claims are allowed “the same as if such claim had arisen before 
the date of the filing of the petition.”367  In other words, section 1305 permits 
post-petition taxes that become due while a Chapter 13 case is pending to be 
treated as pre-petition claims, which brings claims for post-petition taxes 
within the purview of Chapter 13 plans.  Like its Chapter 12 counterpart, 
  
 359. Id. 
 360. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012) 
(No. 10-875), 2011 WL 4957383, at *4. 
 361. 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a). 
 362. Id. § 507(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 363. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44 
(2001) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, 
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as 
effective.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))). 
 364. See 11 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006). 
 365. See id. § 1228. 
 366. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *37-39. 
 367. 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), (b). 
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section 1322(a)(2) states that a Chapter 13 plan shall fully provide for priority 
claims.368  Emphasizing the fact that Chapter 12 was modeled after Chapter 
13, the IRS argued that if the language of Chapter 12 was interpreted to mean 
that a plan provides for the payment of post-petition taxes, then the identical 
language of Chapter 13 rendered section 1305 meaningless.369  
A key distinction between the Halls’ interpretation of section 
1222(a)(2)(A) and section 1305 is that section 1305 covers post-confirmation 
tax claims, while the Halls only argued that section 1222(a)(2)(A) applied to 
post-petition pre-confirmation claims.370  Assuming that post-petition pre-
confirmation taxes are not already appropriately included within confirmed 
plans, then adopting the Halls’ interpretation would still preclude post-
confirmation taxes referenced by section 1305.  Accordingly, the IRS’s ar-
gument that adopting the Halls’ interpretation would render section 1305 
meaningless is without merit. 
2.  Chapter 12 Estate Cannot Incur Taxes 
The IRS buttressed its argument that section 1222(a)(2)(A) does not ap-
ply to administrative expenses with the argument that claims for post-petition 
taxes incurred in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy are entirely outside of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.371  The IRS argued that “estate” referred to by section 
503(b) is equivalent to “separate taxable entity,” as defined by the IRC.372  
Sections 1398 and 1399 of the IRC create a dichotomy of bankruptcy debtors 
whereby a separate taxable entity is created for the bankruptcy estates of in-
dividual Chapter 7 and 11 debtors.373  However, for all other debtors, “no 
separate taxable entity” is created.374  The IRS argued that because there is 
“no separate taxable entity” for Chapter 12 debtors, and because a separate 
taxable entity must exist for a tax to be “incurred by the estate,” then post-
petition taxes in Chapter 12 cases cannot be priority claims.375  The IRS 
elaborated that claims for post-petition taxes are collected outside of Chapter 
12 bankruptcy proceedings.376 
The Halls disagreed with the contention that taxes “incurred by the es-
tate” must be incurred by a separate taxable entity.377  Instead, the Halls ar-
  
 368. Id. § 1222(a)(2); id. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 369. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *39; Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 252, at 48 (“[Y]ou could just rip that page out of the code and throw 
it away if you accept Petitioners’ reading.”). 
 370. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
 371. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *9. 
 372. Id. at 22-23. 
 373. I.R.C. §§ 1398(a), 1399 (2006). 
 374. See I.R.C. § 1399. 
 375. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *11. 
 376. Id. at *17. 
 377. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *8-9. 
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gued that the IRC is relevant to determine the amount of tax liability and the 
manner in which tax returns are filed while the Code controls the distribution 
of bankruptcy estate funds.378  Section 1398 provides that certain bankruptcy 
estates are taxable entities separate from debtors while other bankruptcy es-
tates and debtors are single taxable entities.379  The Halls surmised that even 
if Chapter 12 debtors and bankruptcy estates were not separate taxable enti-
ties, the function of section 1398 is to separate them from debtors for tax pur-
poses.380  However, because the bankruptcy estate exists whether or not a 
separate taxable entity, the estate can incur taxes regardless of the impact of 
section 1398.381 
The IRS also argued that section 346 incorporated sections 1398 and 
1399 and supported its interpretation of the phrase “incurred by the estate.”382  
In the 1978 act, section 346 foreshadowed sections 1398 and 1399 by ex-
pressly creating “separate taxable entit[ies]” for individual Chapters 7 and 11 
debtors and not for Chapter 13 debtors.383  However, unlike sections 1398 and 
1399 and largely due to Congressional inter-committee politics, section 346 
limited this treatment to state and local income taxes.384  A few years later, 
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Tax Act, extending the treatment to federal 
income taxes.385  With the BAPCPA amendments, rather than setting out 
rules for the determination of treatment of state and local income taxes, Con-
gress reworded the provision to mirror the treatment of state and local income 
taxes to reflect the treatment of federal taxes provided by the IRC.386 
Section 346 materially differs from section 503, because section 346 ex-
pressly refers to the IRC and section 503 does not.387  Additionally, while 
section 346 uses “separate taxable entity” and “estate” interchangeably, it 
expressly deals with situations where the estate is in fact a separate taxable 
entity from the debtor.388  Accordingly, conflation of the terms is more sensi-
ble in section 346 than in section 503 where there is no such context.  Finally, 
despite the IRS’s interpretation of the provision, nothing in section 346 pre-
cludes the possibility that an estate that is not a separate taxable entity could 
incur a tax.389 
  
 378. Id. at *8. 
 379. I.R.C. §§ 1398, 1399. 
 380. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *8-9. 
 381. See id. at *8. 
 382. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *37. 
 383. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 276 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6233, 1977 WL 9628. 
 384. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *35-36. 
 385. Id. at *36. 
 386. Id. at *36-37. 
 387. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 346 (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 503. 
 388. 11 U.S.C. § 346. 
 389. See id. 
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V.  HALL V. UNITED STATES 
A.  Majority Opinion 
On June 13, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the circuit split concerning whether under Chapter 12 gov-
ernmental claims arising post-petition from sales of farm assets shall be 
treated as unsecured pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 1222(a)(2)(A).390  On May 
14, 2012, the Court handed down its decision.391  
The Court found the interpretation of section 503(b) central to the reso-
lution of the case.392  In a 5-4 opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, the 
Court adopted the meaning of “incurred by the estate” proffered by the 
IRS.393  The plain meaning doctrine provided the framework of the Court's 
decision.394  The Court defined “incur[red]” as to “suffer or bring on oneself 
(a liability or expense).”395  The Court then reasoned that for tax to be in-
curred by an estate, the estate must be liable for that tax.396  Next, the Court 
looked to section 1398 and section 1399, which provide that estates are liable 
for taxes in Chapter 7 and 11 cases, but that individuals are liable in Chapter 
12 and 13 cases.397  Accordingly, the Court concluded that post-petition taxes 
are not incurred by the estate in Chapter 12 bankruptcies.398    
The Court also found that Code provisions have addressed whether an 
estate is separately taxable since the inception of the Code.399  The Court first 
looked to section 346, a provision included in the original Code, which pro-
vided that estate income is taxed to the estate in Chapters 7 or 11 bankrupt-
cies and to the debtor in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.400  The Court noted that, 
two years later, Congress extended the framework of section 346 to federal 
taxes with sections 1398-99 in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.401  Finally, 
the Court observed that Congress changed the wording of section 346 with 
BAPCPA to “crystallize[] the connection between the Bankruptcy Code and 
the IRC.”402  The court found it persuasive that section 346 ties the treatment 
of state and local tax liability to the IRC’s treatment of federal tax liability 
  
 390. See Hall v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011) (mem.). 
 391. Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012). 
 392. Id. at 1886. 
 393. Id. at 1887-90. 
 394. Id. at 1887. 
 395. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 396. Id.  
 397. Id.  
 398. Id. at 1893. 
 399. Id. at 1887. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 1888. 
 402. Id. 
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rather than expressly assigning state and local tax liability to estates and debt-
ors.403   
Additionally, the Court found that courts, commentators, and the IRS 
have consistently concluded that in Chapter 13 bankruptcies, post-petition 
income taxes are not “incurred by the estate.”404  The Court looked to section 
1305(a)(1), which provides that claims may be filed for taxes that become 
payable while a Chapter 13 case is pending.405  The Court determined that the 
option provided by Chapter 13 to collect post-petition taxes implies that such 
taxes would not otherwise be collectible in Chapter 13 plans.406  Because of 
the similarities between Chapters 12 and 13, the Court found that the absence 
of a corollary to section 1305(a)(1) meant that Chapter 12 plans could not 
provide for the payment of post-petition taxes.407    
The Halls argued that the term “incurred by the estate” referred to the 
timing of the tax rather than which entity is liable for the tax.408  The Court 
rejected the notion that because “all taxes ‘incurred by the estate’” are “nec-
essarily incurred post[-]petition” that all taxes post-petition are incurred by 
the estate.409  The Halls further argued that an estate incurs tax if it is “pay-
able out of estate assets,” and because debtors' income is included in the es-
tate, the tax must necessarily be paid from property of the estate.410  The 
Court remained unconvinced, reasoning that Chapter 12 debtors remain liable 
for filing a return and paying the tax.411  Relying on the purposeful distinction 
made in the Code between the tax liabilities incurred to debtors and estates, 
the Court also found unconvincing the concept that the estate and debtor are 
merged for purposes of Chapter 12.412    
The Halls further supported their interpretation of “incurred by the es-
tate” with legislative history and case law.413  However, the Court found that 
the legislative history could be read consistently with the Court's interpreta-
tion.414  The Court dismissed the case law as inapposite, because the cases 
proffered by the debtors involved corporate debtors, rather than individual 
debtors, reasoning that the Code often treats corporate debtors differently.415   
Finally the Court turned to the legislative history of section 
1222(a)(2)(A) and recognized that Congress intended the provision to provide 
  
 403. Id. at 1889. 
 404. Id. at 1889-90.  
 405. Id. at 1890. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 1890-91. 
 408. Id. at 1891. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. at 1892. 
 412. Id. at 1891-92. 
 413. Id. at 1892. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
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“robust [financial] relief” to farmers rather than the paltry relief afforded to 
farmers under the Court's interpretation.416  However, the Court found the 
mechanism chosen by Congress failed “to enable post[-]petition income taxes 
to be collected in the Chapter 12 plan in the first place.”417  Reluctant to upset 
established bankruptcy concepts, the Court concluded that “if Congress in-
tended [to treat post-petition liabilities as dischargeable], it did not so provide 
in the statute.” 418  
 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
 
The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, maintained that the language of 
the Code could be interpreted consistently with the objective of section 
1222(a)(2).419  Justice Breyer contended that Congress could not have in-
tended the result reached by the majority, relying on Senator Grassley's floor 
statements.420  Because a Chapter 12 estate and debtor are a single entity, 
Justice Breyer found that the fact that a debtor incurs post-petition taxes could 
mean that the estate also incurs post-petition taxes and that such an interpreta-
tion remained consistent with common English.421  
Justice Breyer next addressed the majority's discussion of the dichotomy 
between corporate and individual debtors.422  He found no reason to distin-
guish between taxes incurred by individual and corporate debtors and aptly 
noted that the majority's reasoning implied that “the treatment of post[-
]petition taxes in Chapter 12 proceedings turns on whether the debtor happens 
to be a corporation.”423  
Justice Breyer also found the majority's discussion concerning the “ad-
verse consequences” of adopting the Halls' interpretation to be lacking.424  He 
determined that the majority's reading failed to consider the conceptual prob-
lem of excluding social security, Medicare, and other employee taxes from 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceedings.425  He recognized the similarities of 
Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies, but noted many relevant distinctions, includ-
ing the length of time between filing and plan confirmation and the lack of a 
Chapter 12 analogue to section 1305.426  Finally, Justice Breyer noted that 
adopting the Halls’ interpretation would merely “limit the scope of … [sec-
  
 416. Id. at 1893. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 1894 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 420. Id. at 1896-97. 
 421. Id. at 1898. 
 422. Id. at 1899. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id.  
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at 1900. 
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tion] 1305” to post-confirmation tax liabilities rather than rendering the pro-
vision superfluous.427   
Justice Breyer concluded by noting that the arguments of both parties 
presented plausible interpretations, but that only the Halls' interpretation 
would permit the effect of section 1222(a)(2)(A) intended by Congress.428  As 
a final note, Justice Breyer stated that it is “important that courts interpreting 
statutes make significant efforts to allow the provisions of congressional stat-
utes to function in the ways that the elected branch of Government likely 
intended and for which it can be held democratically accountable.”429 
VI.  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO INCREASE STATUTORY CLARITY 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, bankruptcy law in the 
United States has sympathized with the unique economic circumstances of 
farmers, and most recently, the BAPCPA amendments altered Chapter 12 to 
provide even greater protections to bankrupt farmers.430  Specifically, Con-
gress enacted section 1222(a)(2)(A) with the intent that it would remove veto 
power from the IRS over farmer bankruptcies.431  By contrast, the Bankruptcy 
Tax Act of 1980 was enacted to resolve confusion concerning the tax treat-
ment of bankrupt and insolvent taxpayers.432 In particular, sections 1398-99 
concern administration of bankruptcy estate taxation.433  
The purposes of these statutes are not inherently conflicting and it is un-
likely that their drafters intended substantial interplay between them.  Yet in 
direct contravention of legislative intent, the effect of the IRS’s arguments is 
that sections 1398-99 fatally frustrate the purpose of section 1222(a)(2)(A).434  
The IRS continued to challenge the effect of section 1222(a)(2)(A) with nu-
merous debtors at the trial level and eventually led to the Supreme Court of 
the United States’ grant of certiorari.435 
  
 427. Id. at 1900-01. 
 428. Id. at 1901. 
 429. Id. at 1903. 
 430. See supra Part II.A1. 
 431. See supra Part II.A.2.d. 
 432. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
 433. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 434. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 360, at *14-15 (“The Government 
claims that under its constricted view of Section 1222(a)(2), that provision ‘provides 
meaningful relief to debtors,’ while admitting that taxes incurred due to farm asset 
sales within the entire year of a bankruptcy filing as well as all post-petition sales 
would not be covered under the 2005 amendments to Section 507(a)(8).  The practical 
effect is not just a ‘somewhat smaller’ range of tax debts entitled to the priority-
stripping treatment.” (citations omitted)). 
 435. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011); In re Dawes, 382 
B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), aff’d, 415 B.R. 815 (D. Kan. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d 
1236 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012); In re Gartner, No. BK06–
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The relative success of the IRS was largely a function of statutory clar-
ity.  While the majority of the IRS’s arguments were rebuttable, it is no small 
task to come to any reasonable conclusion when dealing with complex statu-
tory compilations.  The Supreme Court should have sided with the debtors, 
but despite the outcome of the decision, it remains that several statutory pro-
visions of the Code enabled the efforts of the IRS in convincing the Court.  
This Part will introduce several proposed amendments with explanations of 
how each would have resolved the instant case and of how each fits within 
the framework of existing law.  First, this Part will propose an amendment to 
the definition of “claim” that would expressly include administrative ex-
penses claims.436  Second, this Part will propose that the Code include “ad-
ministrative expenses” as a defined term.437  Next, this Part will propose a 
change to section 1222(a) that would expressly allow Chapter 12 plans to 
bind holders of administrative expenses claims.438  Then, this Part will pro-
pose language for section 503(b)(1)(B) that more appropriately reflects the 
historical treatment of administrative expenses.439  Finally, this Part will dis-
cuss the combined effect of the proposed amendments.440 
A.  The Term “Claim” 
The definition of claims should include administrative expense claims.  
The definition proposed by this Comment reads as follows: “§101(5) The 
term “claim” means-- (A) right to payment, including administrative ex-
penses, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured; . . . .” 
The parties in Hall agreed on the inconsistency of the Code’s usage of 
“claims” and “expenses.”441  However, with respect to section 1222(a)(2)(A), 
the parties failed to agree on whether claims included administrative ex-
  
40422–TLS, 2008 WL 5401665 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2008); In re Schilke, 379 
B.R. 899 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Knudsen v. I.R.S., 581 F.3d 696 (8th 
Cir. 2009), abrogated by Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012).  
 436. Infra Part VI.A. 
 437. Infra Part VI.B. 
 438. Infra Part VI.C. 
 439. Infra Part VI.D. 
 440. Infra Part VI.E. 
 441. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *14 (“To be sure, Congress 
has not rigorously adhered to that terminological distinction, since some Bankruptcy 
Code provisions refer to administrative expenses as ‘claims’”); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 252, at 16 (“There are numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code that refer to administrative expenses as claims, including 1226.”). 
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penses442 or whether the legislature intended to exclude administrative ex-
penses when it chose “claims.”443  Countervailing evidence on each side fur-
ther frustrates efforts of interpretation.  The IRS supported its argument with 
legislative history from the Act of 1978 evidencing an intended dichotomy 
with respect to section 507 and its cross-reference to section 1222(a)(2)(A).444  
Alternatively, the Halls flagged several provisions evidencing apparent con-
flation of the terms.445  The inclusion of administrative expenses in the defini-
tion of claims facilitates resolution of this ambiguity. 
Beyond resolving ambiguity, the effect of this alteration is modest.  As 
indicated by the Halls, several provisions currently conflate the terms.446  
Importantly, the two terms are not equated, but administrative claims merely 
become a subset of claims.  This result is sensible because the broad defini-
tion of claims, as it stands, arguably includes “administrative expenses.”447 
However, the proposed amendment would remove any future argument that 
the drafters’ use of the word “claims” shows intent to exclude administrative 
expenses.  
B.  The Term “Administrative Expense” 
The term “administrative expense” is not currently defined within the 
Code.  The definition proposed by this Comment defines the term as “an ex-
pense incurred during the administration of the estate.”  While the definition 
appears circular and uninformative, the lack of a definition spurred the IRS’s 
argument.  By muddling the distinction between post-confirmation and post-
petition, this term’s ambiguity enabled the IRS’s arguments concerning sec-
tion 1305.  By defining administrative expense in relation to the pertinent 
phase of the bankruptcy proceedings, the proposed amendment distinguishes 
between post-petition and post-confirmation by emphasizing the administra-
tion period.  Because post-petition would include both post-confirmation and 
administration, no future argument could be made that plans providing for 
administrative expenses would render ineffective provisions allowing for 
plans to provide for post-petition claims. 
In support of the proposed amendment, recall that section 1226(b)(1) 
implicitly recognizes the distinction between administrative expenses and 
  
 442. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 360, at *13 (“The notion that Con-
gress intended to refer to all these subsections of Section 507 and not refer to 
507(a)(2) is implausible.”).  
 443. Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *14 (“The reference in Section 
1222(a)(2) to ‘claims’ under Section 507, rather than to ‘expenses and claims’ under 
Section 507, is thus consistent with the understanding that a Chapter 12 plan is limited 
to pre-petition debts.”). 
 444. Id. 
 445. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *14.  
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. at *14-15. 
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post-confirmation expenses in light of the dichotomy presented by section 
1222(a)(2)(A).448  If Congress intended section 1226(b)(1) to apply to admin-
istrative expenses, it would have referred to “claims entitled to priority under 
section 507(a)(2)” rather than “claim[s] of the kind specified in section 
507(a)(2).”449  Because section 507(a)(2) expressly deals with administrative 
expenses, section 1226(b)(1) must be referring to something else: post-
confirmation expenses.450  The murkiness of “administrative expenses” al-
lowed the IRS to convincingly misconstrue section 1226(b)(1) as a mecha-
nism to pay all administrative expenses under Chapter 12 proceedings. 
While administration of estates may vary from chapter to chapter, ad-
ministration can only last as long as estates exist.451  With respect to Chapters 
12 and 13, the bankruptcy estate ceases to exist after plan confirmation when 
property vests to the debtor.452  As stated by the Halls, “[t]he caveat to that 
principle is that a plan can provide for the estate to continue,” which may lead 
to further administrative expenses.453  While these cases are unusual, the ad-
ministration period may persist indefinitely, and perhaps prudence dictates 
creation of a new term, or revival of an old one for the period between filing 
and confirmation to proscribe further ambiguity.454  As a final note, while the 
proposed definition is broadly phrased, section 503 and its cross-references 
remain the primary mechanism for what administrative expenses may be con-
sidered allowable claims.  
C.  Who is Bound by a Chapter 12 Plan 
Section 1227(a) should be amended to reflect that Chapter 12 plans are 
binding on holders of administrative expense claims.  The definition proposed 
by this Comment reads as follows: 
§ 1227(a) Except as provided in section 1228(a) of this title, the 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, each creditor, each 
holder of a claim entitled to priority under section 507(a)(1)(C) or 
(2), each equity security holder, and each general partner in the 
debtor, whether or not the claim of such creditor, such holder of a 
  
 448. See supra notes 323-25 and accompanying text.  
 449. See supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text.  
 450. See supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text.  
 451. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 360, at *10-11 (“As a general 
principle, the bankruptcy estate and administrative expense period end at plan confir-
mation.”).  
 452. Id; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1227(b), 1327(b) (2006). 
 453. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 360, at *10. 
 454. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *17 (“The ‘arrangement period’ 
under Chapter XI is the equivalent of the post[-]petition/pre-confirmation period un-
der the current Bankruptcy Code.” (citing Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 
687-88 (1966))). 
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claim entitled to priority under section 507(a)(1)(C) or (2), such 
equity security holder, or such general partner in the debtor is pro-
vided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor, such holder 
of a claim entitled to priority under section 507(a)(1)(C) or (2), 
such equity security holder, or such general partner in the debtor 
has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan. 
The IRS’s arguments capitalized on the current statute by recognizing 
that section 1227(a) referred only to “creditors,” or pre-petition claim hold-
ers.455  Because the IRS was not a “creditor,” it argued that it could not be 
bound by Chapter 12 plans or by section 1222(a)(2)(A) with respect to its 
post-petition claim.456   
However, Chapter 12 plans are required to provide fully for the payment 
of all claims entitled to priority under section 507.457  In turn, section 
507(a)(1)(C) and section 507(a)(2) grant priority to administrative ex-
penses.458  Accordingly, confirmed Chapter 12 plans must provide for the 
payment of administrative expenses.459  If every other holder of a claim ad-
dressed in a confirmed plan is bound by that plan, then the holder of an ad-
ministrative expense claim should also be bound.  The proposed amendment 
uses language from sections 1222 and 1227 to increase the clarity of this con-
clusion. 
The proposed amendment also properly distinguishes between section 
1226(b)(1) post-confirmation claims and administrative expenses by referring 
to “claims entitled to priority” rather than “claims of a kind entitled to prior-
ity.”460  The retained dichotomy permits section 1226(b)(1) to remain the 
primary mechanism for payment of post-confirmation expenses.461  
D.  What Taxes are Considered Administrative Expenses 
The term “incurred by the estate” should be clarified.  The definition 
proposed by this Comment  reads as follows: “§ 503(b)(1)(B) any tax-- (i) 
incurred during administration of the estate, whether secured or unsecured, 
including property taxes for which liability is in rem, in personam, or both, 
except a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title; . . . .” 
  
 455. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text. 
 456. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.  
 457. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2) (2006). 
 458. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C). 
 459. Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 360, at *4-5 (“Major bankruptcy trea-
tises explain that all priority claims, including administrative expense claims, must be 
provided for in Chapter 12 plans (subject to the exception at issue here), and may be 
deferred instead of paid in cash at confirmation as required in Chapter 11 cases.”). 
 460. See supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text. 
 461. See supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text. 
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The ambiguity created by section 503(b) facilitated the argument that 
post-petition taxes of Chapter 12 debtors were handled entirely outside bank-
ruptcy proceedings.462  The IRS cleverly tied the concept of separate taxable 
entities to an inquiry of whether certain bankruptcy estates incur tax.463  As a 
result, section 503(b) provided the centerpiece for the IRS’s appellate briefs 
as well as acquiescent opinions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.464  The 
proposed amendment would prevent similar arguments. 
For Chapter 12 proceedings, the proposed amendment would have a dif-
ferent effect on income taxes depending on whether such taxes were incurred 
pre-petition, post-petition but pre-confirmation, or post-confirmation.  First, 
section 507(a)(8) affords eighth priority to income taxes for years ending 
prior to filing.465  For such income taxes, section 503(b) is irrelevant.   
Second, section 507(a)(2) through section 503(b) affords second priority 
for income taxes incurred during administration.466  For these income taxes, 
section 503(b) is relevant.467  Under the proposed amendment, tax from sales 
of farming equipment during administration could be characterized as a sec-
tion 503(b) tax, because such tax was incurred during administration.  
Unfortunately, one limitation of section 1222(a)(2)(A) is that no tax is 
incurred until the end of the taxable year.468  For income taxes to be incurred 
  
 462. See supra notes 373-76 and accompanying text. 
 463. See supra notes 373-76 and accompanying text  
 464. See Dawes v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012) (“To determine who has ‘incurred’ a tax, 
then, we must ask who is liable for paying it.  And to answer that question we must 
look to the relevant tax authority . . . . And there, in Title 26, the answer is plain.  In 
individual Chapter 7 and 11 bankruptcies, the trustee is charged with filing a separate 
return on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and paying from that estate any resulting 
taxes.”); United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 
1882 (2012) (“Which, of course, raises the question whether the post-petition tax on 
the sale of the farm at issue in this case was ‘incurred by the estate.’  We are satisfied 
that the answer is no.  The Internal Revenue Code provides that a chapter 12 estate 
cannot incur taxes.”); Brief for the United States, supra note 262, at *22 (“The deter-
mination whether an income tax is ‘incurred by the estate’ depends in part on the 
nature of the debtor and on the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code under which relief is 
sought.” (internal citations omitted)).   
 465. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (Supp. 2011). 
 466. Id. § 507(a)(2). 
 467. Id. 
 468. Pac.-Atl. Trading Co. v. United States (In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 
1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We are persuaded that it is equally apparent from these 
statements that, in the absence of an explicit definition, Congress intended for a tax on 
income to be considered ‘incurred’ on the last day of the income period.”); Interco 
Inc. v. Mo. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Interco Inc.), 143 B.R. 707, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
1992) (“As explained above, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code suggests 
that for priority purposes, a tax is incurred on the last day of the taxable period.”), 
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during administration, the tax year must end during administration.469  Fur-
ther, it is difficult to justify that the effect of section 1222(a)(2)(a) should 
extend beyond administration.470  Accordingly, if no taxable year ends during 
administration, then section 1222(a)(2)(A) does not apply.  Fortunately, this 
barrier may be practically circumvented, as studies have shown that the me-
dian time for Chapter 12 administration is approximately eight months471 and 
that the vast majority of such administrations persist for approximately two 
years.472 
However, there is little reason that debtors who have short or poorly 
timed administrations should be denied the benefits of section 1222(a)(2)(A).  
The issues caused by the fact that taxes are incurred only at the end of the 
taxable year have been addressed in a similar context by section 1398(d)(2) of 
the IRC.  Section 1398(d)(2) permits debtors to truncate their taxable years, 
which allows tax obligations accrued up to the date of filing to become pre-
petition claims and brings such obligations under the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court.473  Similarly, a provision modeled after section 1398(d)(2) could 
be added to extend the reach of section 1222(a)(2)(A) to tax obligations by 
allowing debtors to truncate their taxable year prior to confirmation and thus 
incur taxes during the administration.   
Finally, section 1226(b)(1), through section 507(a)(2), provides that 
post-confirmation administrative expenses must be paid before other plan 
payments are made.474  However, considering the purpose of section 1305 is 
to bring post-confirmation income taxes within Chapter 13 proceedings, it is 
illuminating that Chapter 12 has no corollary.475  The proposed amendment 
limits the reach of section 1226(b)(1) by allowing only taxes incurred during 
the administration as section 507(a)(2) claims.  While section 1222(a)(2)(A)’s 
reach could be extended with additional amendments, Senator Grassley 
drafted the provision with concern primarily about the IRS’s power to veto 
plans during confirmation hearings.476  Further, the Hall debtors argued only 
for this limited effect.477  Accordingly, the fact that income taxes incurred 
post-confirmation are outside Chapter 12 proceedings and the reach of section 
1222(a)(2)(A) is enforced by the proposed amendment.  
  
aff’d sub nom. Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co. (In re L.J. O'Neill 
Shoe Co.), 64 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 469. See In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co., 64 F.3d at 1300. 
 470. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 254, at *41 (declining to argue that Sec-
tion 1222(a)(2)(A) should extend to post-confirmation taxes). 
 471. Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Neil E. Hart et al., supra note 1, at *5. 
 472. Id. at *33. 
 473. See supra notes 181-82, 315-18 and accompanying text. 
 474. 11 U.S.C. § 1226(b)(1) (2006). 
 475. See supra notes 404-07 and accompanying text. 
 476. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. 
 477. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
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The proposed amendment clarifies but does not alter other chapters.  But 
for Section 1305 bringing post-confirmation taxes squarely within the pur-
view of Chapter 13 proceedings, the analysis remains much the same for 
Chapter 13.478  For individual Chapter 7 debtors, section 1398 creates sepa-
rate taxable entities.479  Post-petition income tax of the debtor is beyond 
bankruptcy jurisdiction,480 where tax incurred during administration of estate 
property is properly granted second priority for purposes of liquidation.481  
E.  Effect of Proposed Amendments 
The above-proposed amendments clarify the traditional aspects of bank-
ruptcy law and address issues unforeseen by the drafters of section 
1222(a)(2)(A).  If these amendments are adopted, then future similar argu-
ments by the IRS will be far easier to rebut.  First, debtors will be able to 
show that taxes occurred during bankruptcy administration are priority claims 
with much greater ease.482  Second, debtors will be able to show that such 
claims may be included in their reorganization plans and that these plans are 
binding on those holding such claims without regard to whether or not the 
holders of the claims are “creditors.”483  Third, the IRS will be unable to use 
section 1398 to frustrate section 1222(a)(2)(A), because the inquiry of 
whether a tax is an administrative expense will be clearly controlled by when 
a tax is incurred, rather than which entity incurred it.484 
Concerning substantive changes in the law, the effect of the proposed 
amendments is minimal.  As the drafters intended, section 1222(a)(2)(A) 
allows family farmers filing under Chapter 12 to sell farm assets during the 
administration period in order to facilitate greater financial flexibility and a 
  
 478. See 11 U.S.C. § 1305. 
 479. I.R.C. § 1398(a) (2006).  
 480. In re Haedo, 211 B.R. 149, 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“If the debtor 
makes the election, the tax liability attributable to the pre[-]petition year constitutes a 
priority claim against the estate; but if he does not, the entire liability for the year of 
the bankruptcy filing is a claim against the debtor but is not collectible from the es-
tate.”). 
 481. In re Trowbridge, 74 B.R. 484, 485 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In general, 
post[-]petition property taxes, (as well as certain other taxes), are treated as an admin-
istrative expense liability of the estate under section 503(b)(1)(B) and allowed as a 
first distribution priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).”); Lambdin v. Comm’r 
(In re Lambdin), 33 B.R. 11, 12 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (“This type of post[-
]petition tax is classified as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) 
and has a first priority in payment from property of the estate, along with all other 
administrative expenses, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).”). 
 482. See supra Part VI.A, B. 
 483. See supra notes Part VI.C. 
 484. See supra notes Part VI.D. 
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more feasible plan.485  The Code treats the resulting tax obligations as general 
unsecured claims, which are not required to be paid fully under reorganiza-
tion plans and may be discharged upon successful completion of the plan.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Hall, the Supreme Court of the United States held in favor of the IRS 
with a decision that contravenes legislative intent and frustrates the efforts of 
Senator Grassley.  The IRS will retain a veto over economic actors sensitive 
to the ebb and flow of weather and commodity prices and invaluable in our 
society as providers of sustenance.  Even if the Court had held in favor of the 
Halls, legislative reform towards statutory clarity would remain a meaningful 
issue for the law of bankruptcy.  While Hall centers on a single provision, the 
issues of interpretation faced by the Supreme Court may have significant 
ramifications throughout the Code affecting substantial numbers of future 
debtors.  In the tumultuous economic times of today, bankruptcy continues to 
be an important institution allowing financially struggling citizens a clean 
slate.  While the BAPCPA amendments are far from a model of clarity, one 
can only hope that educators, practitioners, courts, and legislators can work in 
harmony to improve bankruptcy law with a concerted effort towards illumina-
tion of vagueness, elimination of inconsistencies, and integration of sound 
policy.     
 
  
 485. See supra Part II.A.2.d. 
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